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Abstract 
Corporate political activity (CPA) has been recognized as a source of sustainable competitive 
advantage. Its proponents, mostly nonmarket strategy researchers, argue that political capital 
enables firms to influence their regulatory and policy environments, shape their competitive 
space, and improve their performance. Consequently, there is a widely held view that the 
performance of firms depends not only on the ability of managers to exploit economic 
markets but also on their ability to succeed in political markets. To test the value of political 
activism, recent scholarship has probed the relationship between CPA and firm performance. 
However, random mixed findings and the fragmented nature of the field raise more questions 
than provide answers to the nature of this relationship. This systematic review examines 
scholarly articles for evidence of the impact of CPA on firm value. 
Drawing on 56 articles contributing to the topic and applying the CIMO-logic method of 
synthesis, this study discusses the findings within a framework of four elements. First, it 
examines the contexts within which CPA has been investigated. Second, it presents findings 
on the strategies that are studied. Third, it investigates the performance outcomes of CPA. 
Fourth, it explores the mechanisms that underpin the performance outcomes of CPA. The 
findings suggest that CPA is positively related to firm performance, an indication that there is 
value in political activism. However, counter evidence is reported by a few studies. The 
evidence also reveals that institutional contexts impact the political strategies used by firms 
or studied by researchers. Even though most of the studies lack theoretical grounding, social 
capital, cronyism and agency relationships are the popularly cited or implied mechanisms 
underlying the CPA-firm performance relationship. Following from the discussion, two 
propositions linking contexts, interventions, and outcomes are developed. The study suggests 
future research directions based on the gaps/limitations identified in the literature. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In the wake of increased global competition, business managers are constantly seeking for 
ways to enhance the competitive advantage of their firms. In doing this, they have 
increasingly become cognizant of the fact that marketplace strategy alone has become 
difficult to deliver superior firm performance. A mix of both market and nonmarket strategy 
has been posited as the ultimate integrated strategy that confers sustained competitive 
advantage on firms (Baron, 1995; Lawton et al., 2013). Consequently, firm performance is 
dependent on the ability of managers to influence their regulatory environments and exploit 
their markets (Marsh, 1998; Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2008). As noted by Schuler (1996), 
the acquisition of market resources to the neglect of building political capital could have a 
negative toll on competitive advantage. Corporate political activity (hereafter CPA) has 
gained prominence in both practice and research as a strategy that firms use to influence 
government policy, shape their regulatory space, and drive their performance (Getz, 1997; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004). The need for firms to participate in the political 
process arises from the daunting reality that almost every firm is affected by government 
regulation and policy (Stigler, 1971).  
The underlying rationale for CPA is to improve the fortunes of the firm (North, 1990; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Schuler et al., 2002b). In other words, it is intended to provide firms 
with access to the corridors of political power (Keim and Zeithaml, 1986), reduce uncertainty 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999), and subsequently empower firms with the ability to influence their 
competitive space (McWilliams et al., 2002; Capron and Chatain, 2008). However, a quick 
scan of extant literature reveals that evidence of the relationship between CPA and firm 
performance is mixed. While some studies report a positive relationship between political 
activism and performance, other studies report the absence of a significant relationship or 
even a negative relationship. Hence, our knowledge of the impact of CPA on firm 
performance is not complete or conclusive. As recommended by Sean et al. (2011), future 
scholarship should continue to investigate how CPA impacts performance. As much as the 
call by Sean and colleagues (2011) is worth heeding to, there is the need to systematically 
review the current literature that examines this topic. That way, we will not only be reaching 
conclusive evidence as to the nature of the CPA-firm performance relationship, but we will 
also be identifying possible and optimal avenues to contribute to the topic by way of further 
research (Tranfield et al., 2003; Grant and Booth, 2009). 
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1.1 Aim of the Review 
This systematic review aims to examine, in an objective and structured manner, the empirical 
evidence regarding the impact of CPA on firm performance. It specifically addresses the 
question below: 
 What is the relationship between corporate political activity and firm performance? 
The following sub-questions will be also addressed: 
 What CPA strategies have been studied? 
 In what contexts has the relationship between CPA and firm performance been studied? 
 What are the different forms of firm performance? 
1.2 Structure of the Review 
This review is organized into eight chapters. Following this introduction, the other chapters 
unfold as follows. The theoretical background informing this review is presented in the next 
chapter. Chapter 3 contains the review methodology while chapter 4 provides a descriptive 
account of the reviewed literature. In Chapter 5, thematic findings are presented following the 
Context-Intervention-Mechanism-Outcome logic (CIMO-logic) (Denyer et al., 2008). These 
findings are synthesized in Chapter 6 and discussed in Chapter 7. The review is concluded in 
Chapter 8 where limitations are outlined and a reflection on personal learning is done. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Framing: Positioning the Field of Inquiry 
In this section, I present three main literature domains that inform and influence the scope of 
this review. An analysis of extant literature in these domains will set the tone for an 
investigation of the impact of CPA on firm performance. The domains include 1) Corporate 
Political Activity; 2) Business and public policy; and 3) Corporate boards and politics. First I 
explore the CPA literature. Second, I examine literature on business involvement in public 
policy. Finally, I explore the literature on the connections between corporate boards and 
politics. 
2.1 Corporate Political Activity 
CPA can simply be defined as actions undertaken by firms to influence public policy 
(Shaffer, 1995; Getz, 1997). It is a nonmarket strategy whereby firms’ expend efforts in 
attempts to influence government policy (Hillman et al., 2004). Its prominence, both in 
practice and research, has risen over the past few years (Bonardi et al., 2006). The CPA 
literature is mainly focused on: 1) the antecedents of CPA; and 2) CPA and firm 
performance. The antecedents of CPA are among the most researched topics of CPA. 
Hillman et al. (2004) classified CPA antecedents into four groups namely: firm; industry; 
issue; and institutional. Size is the foremost determinant of CPA (Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et 
al., 2011). Large firms are politically active due to the resources and capabilities at their 
disposal (Mitchell et al., 1997; Hansen and Mitchell, 2000; Hillman, 2003; Schuler, 1996; De 
Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001; Hart, 2001; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008; Capron and Chatain, 
2008; McWilliams et al., 2002). Firms with a large proportion of revenue from government 
sales are also more likely to engage in CPA (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000; Hillman and Hitt, 
1999; Hadani, 2011). Ownership influences political activism as foreign-owned firms are 
cautious not to be tagged as influencing political processes in other countries. Consequently, 
they are largely invisible with their CPA (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000). Highlighting the 
nature of firm diversification as a determinant of political activism, Hillman (2003) noted that 
conglomerates are more active in broad policy issues while related-diversified firms have the 
flexibility to participate in specific/narrow policy issues. Due to the free-rider problem 
(Olson, 1971; Murphy et al., 1993), firms in small or concentrated industries are more 
politically active since they are able to share the cost and benefits of political actions (Hersch 
and McDougall; Schuler, 1996; Hillman, 2003; Grier et al., 1991; Grier et al., 1994). 
Institutional characteristics such as form of government, corruption, and 
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corporatism/pluralism influence the way firms conduct CPA (Hillman and Keim, 1995; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Barron, 2011). While there is a consensus on what drives CPA, there 
is hardly any on the impact of CPA on firm performance. For instance, Shaffer et al. (2000) 
find a positive correlation between nonmarket actions and firm performance, but counter 
evidence presented by Coates (2010) shows that CPA erodes firms’ value.  
The following sub-sections delve deeper into smaller streams and themes of CPA. They, 
together, present a holistic picture of the phenomenon under investigation. They also draw on 
the much-researched antecedents of CPA.  
2.1.1 Approaches to CPA 
Hillman and Hitt (1999) in their seminal work identified two general approaches to CPA 
namely: 1) Transactional approach; and 2) Relational approach. Transactional approach to 
political activity is short term (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Firms that adopt this approach await 
the development of salient issues before embarking on a strategy to influence policy 
(Buchholz, 1992). Such an issue-by-issue orientation of strategy is reactive (Getz, 1993) and 
does not attempt to impact policy issues until they are out there in the public domain. A 
transactional approach to corporate political activity can be likened to the transactional form 
of leadership (Bass, 1985) where the focus is on the achievement of specific objectives 
(Hargis et al., 2011).  
The relational approach, however, “attempts to build relationships across issues and 
overtime” (Hillman and Hitt, 1999, p.828). These relationships are forward looking and 
proactive, and can be called upon by the firm as and when policy issues arise. The adoption 
of relational approach implies that firms build political capital (Shaffer and Hillman, 2000), 
or relational capital (Hadani and Schuler, 2013) with politicians or regulators and use these 
ties when the need arises. Literature on strategic networks emphasize that the embeddedness 
of firms in networks of social, professional and exchange relationships creates an imperative 
need for the development of enduring ties with other actors, especially dependencies (Gulati, 
1998). The reliance of firms on government for policy is one of such dependency 
relationships that need to be managed (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Getz, 1997). As the policy 
process is made up of demanders and suppliers (Hillman and Keim, 1995; Bonardi et al., 
2005), a relational approach facilitates the development of trust between actors (Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999) and subsequently creates social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The 
literature suggests that the level of diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Shaffer and 
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Hillman, 2000), culture (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), and firm age (Hillman, 2003) determine the 
approach to CPA. Some of these studies also consider the significance of individual or 
collective CPA, which is vital to understanding CPA performance. 
2.1.2 Individual vs. Collective CPA 
In his seminal work, Olson (1965) identified two ways through which firms and interest 
groups influence public policy: 1) individually; and 2) collectively. Hillman and Hitt (1999, 
p. 830) define individual action as “solitary efforts by individuals, or individual companies in 
this case, to influence public policy” and collective action as “the collaboration or 
cooperation of two or more individuals or firms in the policy process.” This distinction is 
similar to what is reported in market strategy literature where firms choose to pursue market 
opportunities alone or co-act with others.  Collaboration allows firms to reduce uncertainty 
and resource commitments (Burgers and Kim, 1993; Ang, 2008). In CPA, firms choose to 
collude or act individually to influence policy. Typical examples of collective action are those 
involving trade associations, unions and industry groups. The choice of individual or 
collective action is influenced by the costs and benefits of CPA (Keim and Zeithaml, 1986). 
Firms that believe a political action will bring private benefits will likely take individual 
action. However if benefits are collective, firms will prefer collective action so as to share the 
costs of political action with other beneficiaries. This prevents the free-rider problem (Yoffie, 
1987) where firms are not motivated to participate in the provision of a public good provided 
they are not excluded from the resultant benefits (Olson, 1971).  
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) posits the need for firms to manage 
external dependencies and in this case, government. However, the relationship between firms 
and government is not a typical dependency but interdependency. It is an exchange 
relationship where firms provide information and resources to politicians and politicians 
supply policies to firms (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Hence, it is a transfer for mutual benefit. 
Large firms are more likely to engage in individual CPA due to the availability of resources 
and also due to their attractiveness to resource-constrained legislators (Schuler et al., 2002b). 
Even if the benefits of their actions accrue to other non-participating firms, their size makes it 
possible for them to enjoy a larger chunk of the benefits. On the other hand, firms with fewer 
resources prefer collective action (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). The absence of slack resources or 
lack of knowledge of the policy process may cause small firms to collaborate (Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999). Collective action places the responsibility of monitoring the policy arena on a 
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group and allows resource-constrained firms to pull resources together to reduce their per-
unit cost of political action (Chong, 1991).  
Participation in CPA also varies on the corporatism-pluralism continuum (Hillman and Hitt, 
1999). In corporatist countries, cooperation and consensus are strong values and firms in such 
countries are more likely to collaborate than compete (Barron, 2011). Culture in corporatist 
systems frown upon singular interests at the expense of group interests (Drake, 2001). 
Pluralist countries, however, are characterized by self-seeking behaviours where the “winner 
takes it all” mantra holds strong. Here, individual action is predominant. Typically, negative, 
rent-seeking or zero-sum policies are easy to implement in pluralist systems where 
fragmented interest groups compete for favours (Hillman and Keim, 1995). The absence of 
large umbrella associations makes it easy for narrow interests to succeed in affecting policy at 
the expense of others, a situation that will not suffice in corporatist countries where the 
opportunity for special interests to influence policy is limited (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). 
Studies have shown that managers who are socialized in individualistic societies view 
negotiation as competition and will tend to negotiate for self-benefit (Cai et al., 2000; Drake, 
2001). Presidential government systems are more likely to encourage individual action while 
parliamentary systems augment the development of collective action (Hillman and Keim, 
1995). In a nutshell, institutional environments affect firms’ strategic decisions (Peng, 2002; 
Peng, 2003) and the way of participation in CPA (Barron, 2011). 
2.1.3 Political Strategies and Tactics 
There is hardly any consensus on the list of political strategies that firms employ to influence 
public policy (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Earlier work on political strategies dwelled on 
popular strategies such as campaign contributions or lobbying (Baysinger et al., 1985), but in 
recent times, a multitude of political strategies are replete in the literature. For instance, Keim 
and Zeithaml (1986) identified five strategies they claim are common to many firms: 
constituency building, campaign contributions, lobbying, advocacy advertising, and coalition 
building. Similarly, Hillman and Hitt (1999) reported three generic strategies under which 
various tactics can be grouped. Below, I present an overview of the popular strategies of 
CPA.  
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Financial Strategies 
Perhaps the most influential political strategy, financial strategy involves expending money 
on politicians to get favourable policies. The specific tactics in a financial strategy include 
political campaign contributions and lobbying expenditure. Firms make contributions to the 
campaigns of politicians so as to get access and audience when necessary (Kim, 2008). In the 
United States, political action committees (PAC) characterize the political landscape. They 
allow individuals and firms to contribute to support or oppose political candidates. Most of 
the empirical studies on the antecedents of CPA have looked at PAC contributions (Hersch 
and McDougall, 2000; Hansen and Mitchell, 2000; Ansolabehere et al., 2002; Bond, 2004). 
This tactic is not visible in many parts of the world due to institutional variations. 
Corporations may contribute to elections, but this activity is not recorded everywhere. Thus, 
most PAC studies have clustered around the US where there are laws to regulate political 
spending.  
Relational Strategies/Personal Connections 
Another CPA tactic is personal service (Hillman et al. 1999) or political service (Hadani and 
Schuler, 2013). Personal service (having a firm representative in a political position or a 
politician on the board of a firm) is popular in most countries. Drawing on resource 
dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), personal service is a tactic for managing 
external dependencies such as politicians. Firms are affected by policies (Weidenbaum, 1980) 
yet the suppliers of those policies are external of the firm. Co-opting politicians into 
corporate boards through directorships is one way firms manage external dependence (Kotter, 
1979). Personal or political service allows firms to reduce uncertainty related to dependency 
relationships (Getz, 1997).  
Informational Strategies 
Political decision makers need information for the formulation of policy. Firms that have 
information on the costs and benefits of policy preferences use it to influence policy decisions 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999). The targets of an information strategy include bureaucrats and 
politicians. Lobbying, done by hired professionals or by firm executives, is a typical tactic of 
an information strategy (Lord, 1995). It involves “efforts by political professionals or 
company executives to establish communication channels with regulatory bodies, regulators 
and their staff” (Keim and Zeithaml, 1986, p.830). The aim is to monitor the regulatory 
environment and provide information on the consequences of legislation.  
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Another tactic under information strategy is the act of commissioning research on policy 
issues and reporting findings in ways that persuade legislators. Some firms file petitions to 
advocate for new policies or to defend existing ones (Shaffer and Hillman, 2000; Lenway and 
Rehbein, 1991; Schuler, 1996). To lobby or to petition are options for a firm. Lenway et al. 
(1990), using evidence from literature, modelled that when seeking trade protection policies a 
firm is better off investing in strengthening the evidence in a petition than lobbying 
congressmen. As demonstrated by Schuler et al. (2002b), politically active firms combine 
tactics. Hence it is possible for firms to use lobbying and petitions simultaneously to 
influence regulations. 
 Constituency Building 
Constituency building refers to efforts to “identify, educate and motivate to political action 
those individuals who may be affected by policy that have an impact on the corporation” 
(Keim and Zeithaml, 1986, p.839). Unlike financial and information strategies that directly 
target politicians and regulators, this strategy is indirect. It is geared towards influencing 
citizens, voters or the general public who in turn influence politicians (Baysinger et al., 
1985). A corporation’s constituency typically consists of its employees, suppliers, dealers, 
shareholders and residents of the community within which it is located (Keim and Zeithaml, 
1986). Constituency building is a “bottom-up” communications strategy (Buchholz, 1992) 
where grassroots support is mobilized for political action (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). 
Shareholders will support activities that increase the value of their firm; hence they are a 
resource a firm can use to execute a constituency building strategy (Baysinger et al., 1985). 
Similar to constituency building is advocacy advertising which is designed to reach a broader 
audience (Sethi, 1979). Basic requirements including credibility, accuracy, and non-
coerciveness need to be met by advocacy programs (Keim and Zeithaml, 1981). Additionally, 
press conferences are used by firms to build a strong constituency.  
The above mentioned strategies will be the focus of this thesis where evidence of their impact 
on firm performance will be examined.  
2.1.4 Types of CPA 
Political behaviour can be classified into different broad types. Meznar and Nigh (1995) 
argue that corporate political activities can be grouped into two types: 1) activities that buffer 
from the regulatory, social and political environments and; 2) activities that bridge with the 
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environment. They define buffering as “trying to keep the environment from interfering with 
internal operations and trying to influence the external environment” and bridging as to 
“adapt organizational activities so that they conform to external expectations (Meznar and 
Nigh, 1995, p.976). Bridging involves proactive actions used to inform government about the 
possible effects of regulation (Hillman et al., 2004). These activities, including lobbying and 
campaign contributions, are intended to shape policy (Weidenbaum, 1980). Bridging is a 
“reactive form of behaviour” (Hillman et al., 2004) which resembles Boddewyn and Brewer’s 
(1994) “non-bargaining” political behaviour. Here, compliance, avoidance and circumvention 
are the tactics used in “passive reaction” (Weidenbaum, 1980). In uncertainty environments, 
firms are more likely to bridge and buffer (Meznar and Nigh, 1995). This allows them to 
influence policies and comply with those they cannot change.  Large firms with more 
resources, large market share, good technology and economic spill-overs are likely to buffer 
(Meznar and Nigh, 1995; Blumentritt, 2003). This argument is consistent with Pfeffer and 
Salancik’s (1978) finding that size is positively related to a firm’s power over the external 
environment. Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) also proposed that firms are likely to buffer 
when a policy issue is salient.  
Another way to classify firms’ political behaviour is using the visibility-invisibility 
continuum. Firms can choose to either be visible or invisible with their political activities. 
Institutional factors largely affect this decision. During political turmoil, corporations dim the 
light on their CPA in order to avoid backlash from the public or new governments (Decker, 
2011). Also in countries with strong nationalist governments, the threat of nationalization 
(Minor, 1994; Williams, 1975) of assets deters visibility. This threat is more severe for 
foreign firms. Mitchell and Hansen (2000) argued that firms with foreign ownership do not 
make PAC contributions (visible) in order not to be perceived as influencing political process 
in foreign countries. To reduce visibility, firms can take collective action, i.e. acting through 
associations and unions. However, there is little research on the typology and of CPA 
(Hillman et al., 2004), particularly on the in/visibility of CPA.    
2.1.5 Theoretical Foundations of CPA Research 
The CPA field is informed by a number of theories including agency, institutional, resource 
dependency, public choice, resource-based-view (RBV), and exchange theories (Getz, 1997). 
Due to the multitude of antecedents that determine political action, no one theory is optimal 
for the study of CPA (Lux et al., 2011). However, the dominant theories include institutional 
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theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; North, 1990), RBV (Barney, 1991) and transaction cost 
theory (Williamson, 1985). Institutional variables such as form of government (Hillman and 
Keim, 1995), corporatism/pluralism (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Barron, 2011), and corruption 
(Kim, 2008) influence the nature and benefits of CPA. The implementation of effective 
political strategies to a large extent depends on firm resources (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Lawton et al., 2013) while the decision to internalize or outsource CPA is informed by 
transaction costs (Sawant, 2012). Much of CPA research has assumed an institutional 
perspective (Henisz, 2004; Doh et al., 2012). New institutional economics (North, 1990; 
Bonardi et al., 2006) posits that political and regulatory uncertainty shape nonmarket 
strategy; neo-institutionalism (Scott, 2005) observes the impact of social forces on political 
actors responsible for policy making; and national business systems (Hansen and Mitchell, 
2001; Khanna et al., 2005; Jackson and Deeg, 2008) suggest that variations in political-
economic models call for different approaches to nonmarket strategy.  
2.2 Business and Public Policy 
Political behaviour is attractive for a variety of reasons which include the ability of political 
power and influence to provide more sustainable competitive advantage (Boddewyn and 
Brewer, 1994). Virtually all firms in the United States are regulated (Weidenbaum, 1980). 
Interestingly these regulations are borne out of public policy, which raises the interest of 
firms in the policy process. According to Bernhagen and Brauninger (2005. p. 46), the public 
policy making process is “decision making of interdependent public and private actors who 
engage in exchange relations.” This concept depicts the policy arena as a marketplace with 
demanders and suppliers (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Hillman and Keim, 1995; Bonardi et 
al., 2005; Kingsley et al., 2012). 
Aggregately, policy decisions are skewed towards business interests (Bernhagen and 
Brauninger, 2005). In capitalist economies, the private sector drives economic growth 
through employment and tax revenue. Aware that the dire consequences of policies that are 
inimical to business interests can affect their re-election fortunes, politicians tend to 
accommodate the preferences of the private sector in policy formulation. This has caused an 
increased involvement of business in policy making. According to Grossman and Helpman 
(1994), politicians are maximizing agents who pursue interests of their own rather those of 
society. They argue that campaign contributions are able to cause politicians to alter policies 
to suit the interests or preferences of contributing firms, and hence conclude that trade 
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protection is for sale. Earlier works such as Saltzman (1987) found that PAC contributions 
influenced congressional voting on labour issues in the United States. Similarly, Moore et al. 
(1995) reported that political donations had significant influence on COPE legislations in the 
United States. These studies cast some evidence on the relationship between business and 
politics, particularly the influence of interest groups in policy making (Ramírez and De Long, 
2001; Ramírez and Eigen-Zucchi, 2001).  
However, the power of the corporation to influence policy is limited under some 
circumstances. When policy issues are of interest to many groups and individuals, policy 
favours are difficult to obtain (Hillman and Keim, 1995). Issue salience and wide 
participation leaves little discretion to politicians and policy makers (Bonardi and Keim, 
2005; Schuler, 2008). Election issues and old policy issues are also hard to influence 
(Bonardi and Keim, 2005). It is worth noting that the literature examining the limits of firms 
in the policy process fails to consider the impact of political governance. Autocratic and 
military governments limit the power of the firm. Under these political regimes, elections are 
not significant and firms which unduly interfere in government processes face threats of 
expropriation. In democracies, while competition among politicians is attractive to firms, 
competition among bureaucrats is undesirable because bureaucrats largely maintain the status 
quo (Bonardi et al., 2006; Sawant, 2012). This argument assumes that firms oppose the status 
quo, hence omitting the fact that in policy markets there are factions that advocate for change 
and those that defend existing policies. The latter group would find bureaucrat competition 
highly desirable for the defence of policy and maintenance of the status quo.  
2.3 Corporate Boards and Politics 
Corporate governance basically refers to the relationships between a company’s management, 
board of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders. Studies in this domain have taken on 
a wide range of issues including corporate board of directors and politics (Wai-Ching Poon et 
al., 2013), ownership structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lai and Sudarsanam, 1997), 
organizational ethics (Carroll et al., 2002), social responsibility (Campbell, 2007; Ioannou 
and Serafeim, 2012; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010; Jo and Harjoto, 2012), information 
disclosure (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012) and executive compensation (Noe and Rebello, 
2012). Noted by Coates (2010), corporate governance literature is vast. Perhaps, the strongest 
tie between corporate governance and CPA lie in the fact that both have an overarching aim 
to improve shareholder value. 
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Corporate boards are a useful resource for a firm (Boyd, 1990; Dalton et al., 1998; Zahra et 
al., 2009). Among the many benefits directors confer on firms include legitimacy, advice and 
counsel, and channels of information (Hillman et al., 2000). Any person appointed as a 
director has to support the firm and be concerned with the firm’s problems (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). From this logic, boards are supposed to aid the firm to their best of ability. 
The dynamics of board compositions are interesting. Boyd (1990) studied the relationship 
between board size, the number of interlocks and environmental uncertainty and found that in 
highly uncertain environments and when resources are scarce, board size decreases. Under 
those same conditions, the number of board interlocks increases. Similarly, Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) found that the number of interlocks increases with competition. Highly 
regulated firms mostly appoint lawyers and people with political experience to their boards as 
a way to gain an upper-hand in influencing the policies that affect them (Hillman et al., 
2000).  
As mentioned earlier, the decisions that politicians and regulators make affect the 
performance of firms (Hillman, 2005). Trade agreements, privatization, deregulation are 
among a host of other government policies that alter the economic fortunes of firms (Shaffer, 
1995; Schuler, 1996), causing the surge in corporate attempts to influence public policy. A 
political strategy that can be used in the exchange relationship between government and firms 
is the appointment of people with political experience to boards. It is common to find 
politicians sitting on corporate boards, even though scrutiny of this strategy has increased in 
recent times. Co-opting politicians into boards may provide difficult-to-access and unique 
information about the policy process; confer legitimacy on firms; and bolster access to other 
politicians, which may allow a firm to influence policy decisions (Pfeffer, 1972). As argued 
by Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), the increase in the number of board members with political 
experience signifies the important role of politics in business. They conclude that some 
directors play political roles for firms. The intended overall effect of having politically 
connected boards is for improved firm performance. The political, economic and social ties 
of directors have been reported to have a positive effect on financial performance (Dicko and 
El Ibrami, 2013). In other instances, the ties to government add no significant value to firms 
perhaps due to the constraints and costs of political embeddedness (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). Do 
politicians increase firm performance or do successful firms appoint politicians on their 
boards? This question begs for an answer. Mixed findings on the performance impact of co-
opting politicians into corporate boards call for further studies on the topic.  
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After exploring the concept of CPA, its strategies and general nature; the participation of 
business in politics and public policy; and the connectedness between corporate boards and 
politics, the context is created for an examination of evidence of the impact of CPA on firm 
performance. The methodology employed to answer the research question what is the 
relationship between CPA and firm performance is explained in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
The methodology employed in conducting this systematic review followed the approach 
posited by Tranfield et al. (2003) and Petticrew and Roberts (2006). These studies articulate a 
systematic way of reviewing management and social sciences literature. Prior to beginning 
the review, I carried out a scoping study to “access the size and relevance of literature and to 
delimit the subject area or topic (Tranfield et al., 2003, p.214), to identify the nature and 
extent of research literature (Grant and Booth, 2009), to identify the current state of 
understanding of the topic (Anderson et al., 2008), and to determine the value of undertaking 
a systematic review (Arksey and O'malley, 2005). The scoping process required analytical 
interpretation (Levac et al., 2010) of the “theoretical, practical and methodological history 
debates surrounding the fields and sub-fields of study” (Tranfield et al., 2003, p.214-215).  
This preliminary investigation enabled the systematic gathering and examination of 
information in order to establish strengths, weaknesses or gaps that will help in decision 
making (Davis et al., 2009), and in this case a decision of a research question for a systematic 
review. After scoping the field, a review panel was formed. Subsequently, I developed a 
systematic review protocol which was approved by the panel. 
3.1 Why do a Systematic Review? 
Systematic review is an evidence-based approach which originated from medical sciences 
and healthcare, aimed to improve decision making (Tranfield et al., 2003). In management 
research and social sciences, this approach is a new phenomenon that is yet to gain 
popularity. Management reviews are typically narrative reviews which mostly provide 
descriptive accounts of literature, and they differ significantly from systematic reviews which 
adopt “a replicable, scientific, and transparent process…” and provide an “audit trail of 
reviewers’ decisions, procedures and conclusions (Tranfield et al., 2003, p. 209). Hence 
systematic reviews attempt to reduce reviewer bias as much as possible so as to provide a 
critical account of evidence. 
I conduct a systematic review for a couple of reasons.  First and overarching reason is to 
enable me create a deep foundation for my PhD topic and to develop a research question that 
will allow for the maximization of contribution to literature, theory, and practice. Second, I 
do a systematic review because it ensures rigour and transparency, minimizing the 
weaknesses inherent in traditional narrative reviews (Tranfield et al., 2003; Petticrew and 
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Roberts, 2006). Systematic review techniques reduce bias and subjectivity (Tranfield et al., 
2003). Third, systematic reviews allow for a more holistic picture, and they facilitate the 
identification of common, general, and conclusive evidence (Tranfield et al., 2003). Unlike 
systematic reviews, traditional narrative reviews are “singular” accounts (Tranfield et al., 
2003) and are not conclusive due to conflicting information and difficulty to determine a 
balance of the evidence (Petticrew and Roberts, 2006). Fourth, a systematic review may help 
advance theory by providing opportunities to challenge existing knowledge and established 
schools of thoughts (Petticrew and Roberts, 2006). 
3.2 Review Panel 
A review panel consisting of topic, theory, and methodology experts was assembled to ensure 
quality, reliability, and validity of the systematic review process and outcome.  The panel 
reviewed the scoping study, approved the protocol, provided guidance, and resolved disputes 
about inclusion/exclusion of studies (Tranfield et al., 2003). The review panel consisted of 
the following persons. 
Table 3-1 Members of Systematic Review Panel 
Person Title/Organization Role 
Dr Tazeeb Rajwani Senior Lecturer, Cranfield School of 
Management 
Supervisor and subject expert 
Dr Carlos Mena Reader, Cranfield School of 
Management 
Subject expert 
Dr Colin Pilbeam Senior Research Fellow, Cranfield 
School of Management 
Methodology expert 
Ms Heather Woodfield Information Specialist, King Norton’s 
Library, Cranfield University 
Literature search expert 
 
Dr Tazeeb Rajwani 
Tazeeb is a Senior lecturer in Strategic Management at the Cranfield School of Management. 
He holds or has held visiting faculty positions at London Business School, Kings College 
London, University of Warwick, ALBA (Greece), EM Lyon (France), University of Notre 
Dame, Strathmore University (Kenya), Royal Holloway (University of London) and 
University of Nottingham. Prior to these roles he held a management position at KPMG 
Corporate Finance. He has industrial experience in strategy consulting, project finance, 
corporate finance and international management. His research focuses mainly on corporate 
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political activity, competitive advantage, and turnaround strategies. He has written various 
academic papers, book chapters, reports and white papers. Dr Tazeeb is my supervisor. 
Dr Carlos Mena 
Dr Carlos Mena is Director of the Centre for Strategic Procurement and Supply Management 
and a Reader in Procurement at the Supply Chain Research Centre of the Cranfield School of 
Management. He is also head of the Executive Procurement Network (EPN). The EPN is a 
joint initiative with the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (CIPS) to develop a 
vibrant network of procurement professionals engaged in a collaborative effort to create and 
disseminate thought leadership in the field of procurement.  His expertise is in procurement, 
global sourcing, and sustainability. He is a content expert, particularly in political risk.  
Dr Colin Pilbeam 
Dr. Pilbeam is a Senior Research Fellow within the Centre for Management Knowledge and 
Strategic Change at Cranfield School of Management. His expertise is in organizational 
networks, social networks, higher education management, change management, and supply 
chain. His wider research interest focuses on understanding co-evolution of formal and 
informal structures through the analysis of organizational designs. He has published over 50 
articles in high quality journals, and between 2005 and 2011 he was the Director of the PhD 
programme at the Cranfield School of Management. He is an expert in systematic review 
methodology. Dr. Pilbeam is the chair of my review panel. 
Ms Heather Woodfield 
Heather is an Information Specialist for Social Sciences at the King Norton’s Library, 
Cranfield University. She is a literature search expert who assisted in the development of 
search strings. She also advised on the appropriate databases to search for papers. 
3.3 Search Strategy 
The search strategy used in this review comprised the identification of keywords, terms and 
phrases which I built from the scoping study, the literature, and discussions with the panel 
members (Tranfield et al., 2003). I initially searched two databases for articles from which I 
identified further articles through cross-referencing. Below is the step-by-step search protocol 
I followed. 
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1. Identify keywords and phrases 
2. Form the search strings 
3. Select database 
4. Test the search string. If it does not generates relevant articles, modify the string and 
test again 
5. If string generates relevant articles, select based on title and abstract, and then further 
select based on full paper 
6. Scrutinize selected articles based on quality assessment criteria  
 
3.3.1 Keywords 
There are two constructs in my review question. These are 1) corporate political activity, and 
2) firm performance. As stated in Chapter 2, there are three dominant categories of CPA 
strategies in the literature namely 1) financial, 2) relational, and 3) informational strategies. 
Drawing on several important and seminal studies, I identified the different terms and phrases 
used to describe CPA and firm performance. These key terms are shown in Table 3-2.  
Table 3-2 Search Terms/Phrases 
Domain Sub-Domain Key Terms/Phrases 
Corporate Political Activity     
  Financial  
Political action committees (PACs) 
(Hansen and Mitchell, 2000) 
    
Campaign contributions (Claessens 
et al., 2008) 
    Soft money (Jayachandran, 2006) 
    Political donations (Witko, 2011) 
  
Political contributions (Ansolabehere 
et al., 2002) 
    
corporate political investments 
(Hadani and Schuler, 2013) 
  Relational Political connections (Fisman, 2001) 
    Political ties (Fan et al., 2007) 
    Political links (Hillman et al., 1999) 
  
Politically connected boards 
(Hillman et al., 2004) 
    
Business-government relations 
(Shaffer and Hillman, 2000) 
  Informational 
Lobbying (Lawton and Rajwani, 
2011) 
    Petitions (Lenway et al., 1990) 
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Firm Performance Outcomes   Benefits (Hillman et al., 1999) 
    Performance (Shaffer et al., 2000) 
    Value (Fisman, 2001) 
    Outcomes (Lux et al., 2011) 
    Effectiveness (Hillman et al., 2004) 
    Success (Hillman et al., 2004) 
    Impact (Hillman et al., 2004) 
  Returns (Hadani and Schuler, 2013) 
 
3.3.2 Search Strings 
Search strings were created through a combination of the search terms or phrases shown in 
Table 3-2. Three search strings were created for each of the three sub-domains of corporate 
political activity while a single string was created for firm performance. The individual 
search strings developed are shown in Tables 3-3 and 3-4. 
Table 3-3 Search Strings for CPA 
Financial CPA Strategies Relational CPA Strategies Informational CPA Strategies 
(“political action 
committee” OR “PAC 
contributions” or “politic* 
donat*” OR “campaign 
contribution” OR 
“political contribution” 
OR “corporate politic* 
invest*” OR “soft 
money”) 
(“politic* connect*” OR 
“politic* ties” OR “politic* 
link*” OR “politically 
connected boards” OR 
“business-government 
relations”) 
(lobby* w/5 (corporate OR 
firm) 
 
Table 3-4 Search Strings for Firm Performance 
Firm Performance Outcomes 
(Benefits OR “firm performance” OR performance OR value OR returns OR outcome OR 
effect* OR success* OR impact) 
 
Each of the strings for CPA is combined with the string for firm performance, resulting in 
three different combinations as shown in Table 3-5. Keyword searches were initially 
restricted to titles and abstracts. 
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Table 3-5 Combined Search Strings 
No. Search Theme String 
1 Financial CPA 
Strategies and Firm 
Performance 
(“political action committee” OR “PAC contributions” or 
“politic* donat*” OR “campaign contribution” OR 
“political contribution” OR “corporate politic* invest*” 
OR “soft money”) AND (Benefits OR “firm performance” 
OR performance OR value OR returns OR outcome OR 
effect* OR success* OR impact) 
     
2 Relational CPA 
Strategies and Firm 
Performance 
(“politic* connect*” OR “politic* ties” OR “politic* 
link*” OR “politically connected boards” OR “business-
government relations”) AND (Benefits OR “firm 
performance” OR performance OR value OR returns OR 
outcome OR effect* OR success* OR impact) 
     
3 Informational CPA 
Strategies and Firm 
Performance 
(lobby* w/5 (corporate OR firm)) AND (Benefits OR 
“firm performance” OR performance OR value OR returns 
OR outcome OR effect* OR success* OR impact) 
 
3.3.3 Databases 
Following the methodology of Pittaway et al. (2004), de Menezes and Kelliher (2011), and 
Lawton et al. (2013), I searched the databases ABI/Inform and EBSCO. These databases are 
very comprehensive and they index a vast amount of business literature. Even though there is 
a degree of overlap between the two, it was still worthwhile to search both just in case any 
one of them missed out on a publication. In Table 3-6, the databases are described.  
Table 3-6 List of Databases 
Database Description 
ABI/Inform (ProQuest) 
Contains a wide range of information covering over 3,900 
publications in business and economics.  
EBSCO 
The world’s largest full text database covering over 3,700 
scholarly business publications. 
 
3.3.4 Cross Referencing 
An additional way I identified literature for this review was through cross referencing. The 
articles that were found from the databases shown in Table 3-6 were checked for relevant 
references. Suggested articles from my supervisor, colleagues, and friends were also 
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considered. Literature identified through these approaches went through the same selection 
criteria and quality assessment as those identified directly from the databases. 
3.4 Selection Criteria for Articles 
Operationalizing the search strings resulted in large number of articles. To ensure that only 
relevant papers are reviewed, the articles were scrutinized in a four-stage process based on 
pre-determined criteria. First, I scrutinized titles to identify those that had a relation with the 
review question. Second I screened abstracts to identify papers that contained relevant 
themes. The inclusion criteria shown in Table 3-7 were applied in these first two stages. 
Third, I scrutinized full text of the papers to confirm the presence of themes relevant to the 
review question. Finally, I applied the quality criteria to appraise and select the reviewed 
articles. There is a dearth of literature on this topic; hence relevancy to the review question 
was the most important criteria. There was no restriction to particular geographic regions, 
industry, or methodology. Applying any of such restrictions could render futile the CIMO-
logic approach that this thesis adopts. Considering the review question at hand, only 
empirical papers made it to the final sample. 
Table 3-7 Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
Criteria Inclusion Exclusion Rationale 
Publication 
Theme/Topic 
Studies that examine the 
relationship between CPA and 
firm performance and ask the 
following questions: 
 
 What is the impact of 
CPA on stock and 
operating performance? 
 What is the impact of 
CPA on policy 
performance? 
 
Does not examine 
the relationship 
between CPA and 
firm performance 
To answer the review 
question. The review aims 
to examine the firm 
performance outcomes of 
CPA 
Publication Type Peer-reviewed, scholarly and 
academic papers 
Non-scholarly 
articles, 
Newspapers, trade 
publications, 
magazines, 
conference papers 
and proceedings, 
working papers, 
theses, books 
To ensure relatively 
higher quality due to the 
rigorous review process 
that scholarly articles are 
subjected to. Good 
conference papers are 
usually turned into articles 
later, books and 
conference papers are 
difficult to search 
systematically, 
newspapers and other 
press articles might be of 
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low quality and rigour. 
Date of 
Publication 
From 1969 Before 1969 The origin of CPA 
research is attributed to 
Epstein (1969), and the 
study of CPA-firm 
performance relationship 
began later after 1969 
Language English Non-English English is considered the 
universal language for 
academic publications, 
and also to prevent any 
inaccuracies arising from 
translation 
Sector Private Sector Government or 
Charity Sector 
CPA is largely done by 
private organizations. 
Moreover, the focus of the 
thesis is on private 
business. 
 
3.5 Quality Appraisal 
After selecting papers based on titles, abstract and full text, these papers were appraised for 
quality. This followed a laid down criteria shown in Table 3-8. Following from my review 
question, all relevant papers were empirical and had to meet the quality appraisal criteria in 
order to proceed to the review stage. CPA research is nascent but is spread across journals 
with different rankings. In order not to fall into the trap of assuming that papers in top rated 
journals are necessarily good, journal ranking was not considered in my quality appraisal 
criteria.  
Table 3-8 Quality Appraisal Criteria 
Empirical  - Quantitative papers 1 2 3 4 5 
Theoretical framework and development of hypotheses      
Are the study’s propositions and hypotheses clearly articulated?      
Are the basic arguments of the paper important and interesting?      
Are important premises and assumptions identified?      
Are the key terms defined?      
Description and evaluation of methods      
Is the methodology of the paper clearly identified?      
Are data collection methods described adequately?      
Are the sampling strategy and sample explained?      
Is the operationalization of the variables and the constructs plausible 
(content validity)? 
     
Are dependent and control variables identified and described?      
Do measures theoretically relate to independent and dependent variables 
(construct validity)? 
     
Are questionnaire or other instrument items identified and described?      
Have steps been taken to avoid data collection errors?      
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Is there evidence of reliability or internal consistency in the study?      
Results      
Are the findings adequately and accurately described?      
Are the results related back to original propositions, hypothesis, research 
question, and data analysis? 
     
Do tables provide sufficient and accurate data to allow reader to reach 
independent conclusions? 
     
Is implied causality justified?      
Has the author adequately considered alternative explanations for the 
results? 
     
1=Not at all. 2=To a limited extent. 3=At an acceptable level. 4=To a significant level. 5=Completely 
Source: Modified from Huff (1999, p.158) 
All criteria were scored from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely). A minimum score of 3 in 
relation to each criterion was applied to select the papers that made it to the final sample.  
3.6 Selected Articles 
The search and evaluation process that is presented above resulted in a final sample of 56 
articles. A total of 175 duplicates were identified per each string across both databases. 
Pulling all string data together and conducting a further duplicate check, I found 87 
duplicates between strings for both databases. I further and manually identified 42 duplicates 
after exporting the results from RefWorks to Excel. In total, there were 304 duplicates. The 
search results are shown in Table 3-9 
Table 3-9 Results for Search Strings per Database 
Search String ABI/Inform EBSCO 
Business 
Source 
Complete 
Total for 
Search String 
Total after 
elimination of 
duplicates per 
string 
String 1 72 105 177 153 
String 2 1,456 974 2429 2295 
String 3 107 50 152 135 
Totals 1,630 1,128 2,758 2,583 
Total search results after elimination of duplicates 2,454* 
*262 duplicates were identified using the RefWorks function “find duplicates”, 42 were identified 
manually. 
 
The process of selecting the papers for the review is summarized in Table 3-10. Titles, 
abstracts, and full texts were screened for relevance before quality appraisal was done. The 
list of selected articles is shown in Appendix A, and the quality appraisal scores are provided 
in Appendix C.  
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Table 3-10 Selection Process 
Title 
Screening 
 Started with 2,454 articles after removing all duplicates 
 
 1,523 titles related to entirely different research areas such as public-private 
partnerships, NGOs, Development, Capital Control, etc. Examples of titles 
include: “Reasons for implementing public private partnership projects”, 
“Stakeholder management for public private partnerships”, “Investments in 
rent-seeking”, “Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to 
Crisis”, “The influence of UK NGOs on the common agricultural policy” 
 668 titles related to the research area but did not relate or refer to the review 
question. These titles related to the types and determinants of political strategies, 
and to political organization for lobbying. Some examples of such titles include: 
“Were lobbyists on income tax accounting influenced by income strategies?”, 
“Who Gave Soft Money? The Effect of Interest Group Resources on Political 
Contributions”, “Competition and political organization: Together or alone in 
lobbying for trade policy?”, “Firm-level determinants of political influence”, 
“Constituency building as the foundation for corporate political strategy”, “Are 
firms' lobbying strategies universal? Comparison of lobbying by French and UK 
firms” 
  2 articles were eliminated because they related to state/municipal lobbying and 
not corporate level political activity. Example: “Fiscal Federalism, State 
Lobbying and Discretionary Finance: Evidence from India” 
 In total, 2,193 papers were eliminated because they didn’t address the review 
question 
Abstract 
Screening 
 Started with 261 articles after title screening 
 58 articles were eliminated because they related to different research areas 
 89 were eliminated because they related to the research area but did not address 
the research question. Examples include: “Latino Political Connectedness and 
Electoral Participation”, “Political Connections: The Missing Dimension in 
Leadership”, “The Contingent Value of Corporate Political Ties” 
 A total of 147 articles were eliminated, retaining 114 articles.  
Full text 
Screening 
 Started with 141 articles (114 from databases, 25 from cross-referencing, and 2 
from recommendations by supervisor) 
 67 articles from the databases and 5 from cross-referencing were eliminated 
because they were not related to the research question. These papers focused on 
state enterprises, political strategies and antecedents of CPA. Others were 
conceptual, or did not address a specific political strategy. Examples of titles 
include: “High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst 
forecast accuracy around the world”, “Cross-border political donations and 
Pareto-efficient tariffs”, Firm Level Performance Implications of Nonmarket 
Actions 
 A total of 72 articles were excluded at this stage, retaining 69 articles.  
Quality 
Screening 
 Quality screening was conducted for 69 articles 
 13 articles ( 2 from cross-referencing and 11 from the databases) were 
eliminated due to issues with methodology and trustworthiness 
 The final sample contained 56 articles (18 from cross-referencing, 2 from 
recommendations, and 36 from the databases) 
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3.7 Data Extraction 
Relevant data from all 56 articles were extracted to a standardized data extraction form 
designed to capture CIMO-logic themes, methods, and key findings in the literature (see 
Table 3-11). Because of the diversity of the individual papers with regards to contexts, 
strategies, mechanisms and performance outcomes, broad categories were developed for each 
element in the CIMO framework. Data extraction facilitated the rendering of a descriptive 
account and a synthesis of the literature. The extraction sheets for all individual papers are 
shown in Appendix E  
Table 3-11 Data Extraction Form 
Citation/Description 
Title: 
Author(s): 
Journal: 
Year: 
Keywords: 
Research objective/Question: 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: 
Methods of analysis: 
 
Theme 
Context: 
Intervention/Strategy 
Mechanism implied by theory 
Outcome 
 
Results 
Key findings: 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
3.8. Synthesis 
Due to the fragmented and inconsistent nature of the literature, synthesis of information 
followed the CIMO-logic (Denyer et al., 2008) as applied by Pilbeam et al. (2012). This 
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method relates to the design science paradigm where the focus is on improving outcomes 
through the implementation of appropriate interventions. Design propositions are prescriptive 
(Denyer et al., 2008) and are able to provide information on what to do under what 
circumstances to achieve what outcomes (Pilbeam et al., 2012). By this synthesis method, I 
explored the contexts (C) within which CPA has been investigated, the 
strategies/interventions (I) implemented, the firm performance outcomes (O) of those 
strategies, and the mechanisms (M) underlying the performance outcomes. Thereafter, I 
combined these four elements to derive a whole picture. I chose this explanatory and realist 
method of synthesis (Pilbeam et al., 2012) in order to understand how CPA strategies and 
outcomes vary in different contexts or circumstances, and also to understand what 
mechanisms impact performance. The assumption made here is that different CPA strategies 
may produce different outcomes in different contexts through different mechanisms. The 
CIMO-logic assessment of the selected papers is presented in Appendix D.    
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Chapter 4 Descriptive Account of Literature 
In this section, I describe the characteristics of the selected articles that are reviewed. I 
present information on the journals in which the articles are published, as well as the rankings 
of those journals. Information on the years in which the articles were published, the countries 
and industries of focus, the methods employed, the type of strategy, the type of outcome, and 
the direction of outcome are also presented. This descriptive information, taken together, 
provides an overview of research related to the review question – what is the relationship 
between CPA and firm performance? All articles are peer-reviewed and scholarly, and were 
mainly selected from the ABI/ProQuest and EBSCO databases. Others were obtained through 
cross-referencing and recommendations from my supervisor.  
4.1 Journal Features 
The selected articles come from 37 different journals (see Table 4-1), and this to a certain 
extent indicates how fragmented the research on this particular review question is. These 
journals belong to different fields including politics, economics, finance, management, 
accounting, and public policy. This observation is however not surprising because CPA is a 
relevant phenomenon in all of the aforementioned research fields. While political scientists 
and public policy scholars are seeking to understand business influence on government 
policy, management scholars are examining the economic and financial impact of business 
involvement in politics. The broad range of fields covered by these journals ensures that a 
wide array of research areas is represented. Of all 37 journals, only six are traceable to the 
management field and this signals the paucity and nascence of CPA research in this domain. 
Finance and economics journals dominate, perhaps due to the fact that the review focuses on 
firm performance. The “Journal of Financial Economics” makes the most contribution to the 
review with four articles, followed by the “Journal of Accounting & Public Policy” and 
“Strategic Management Journal” with three apiece.  
As per Cranfield School of Management’s journal rankings (February 2012), 11 articles come 
from 4* journals, 11 from 3* journals, four from 2* journals, two from 1* journals, and nine 
from journals that are not ranked. Obviously, my decision not to use journal ranking as a 
criteria has ensured that more articles are included and reviewed and this makes the findings 
robust. 
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Table 4-1 List of Journals, Frequency of Occurrence, and Ranking 
Journal Name Frequency Journal Rank 
Academy of Management Journal 2 4* 
Accounting & Finance 1 2* 
American Economic Review 3 4* 
American Journal of Political Science 1 Not ranked 
American Politics Research 1 Not ranked 
Asian Economic Journal 1 Not ranked 
Atlantic Economic Journal 1 Not ranked 
Business & Politics 2 2* 
Business & Society 2 2* 
Canadian Journal of Economics 1 3* 
Chinese Management Studies 1 Not ranked 
Economics Letters 1 Not ranked 
Economics of Transition 1 1* 
Election Law Journal 1 Not ranked 
European Financial Management 1 3* 
European Management Review 1 1* 
German Economic Review 1 Not ranked 
Journal of Accounting & Economics 2 4* 
Journal of Accounting & Public Policy 3 3* 
Journal of Banking & Finance 2 3* 
Journal of Business Ethics 1 3* 
Journal of Corporate Finance 2 3* 
Journal of Finance 2 4* 
Journal of Financial Economics 4 4* 
Journal of Financial Research 1 3* 
Journal of International Money & Finance 1 3* 
Journal of Labor Research 1 Not ranked 
Journal of Law and Economics 2 4* 
Journal of Management 1 4* 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 1 4* 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 1 3* 
Public Choice  2 3* 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 4* 
Review of Financial Studies 2 4* 
Southern Economic Journal 1 3* 
Strategic Management Journal 3 4* 
Thunderbird International Business Review 1 2* 
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4.1.1 Article Publication Year  
All reviewed articles were published within the last 25 years, with the earliest article 
published in 1988. This reveals that the relationship between CPA and firm performance 
started to receive attention in the late 1980s. However this attention declined until 1996 when 
research on the topic began to surge, highlighting the notion that CPA in general is an 
emergent and nascent field. It is within the last eight years that 42 articles which represent 
75% of the total articles reviewed by this thesis were published. The year 2006 recorded the 
highest in the distribution with nine articles published in mostly finance and economics 
journals. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Yearly Distribution of Articles 
4.1.2 Countries and Continents of Focus 
There are 50 articles which focus on 10 different countries including the United States, 
Malaysia, China, Italy, and Germany among others (see Figure 4-2). The remaining six 
articles draw on data collected from multiple countries. United States dominates with 27 
articles, followed by China with nine. Four continents are represented in the data, namely 
North America, South America, Asia, and Europe. 
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Figure 4-2 Geographic Distribution of Articles 
4.1.3 Industry of Focus 
Most of the articles are not focused on single or specific industries; they are based on data 
collected from multiple industries. There are 51 of such articles. For the remaining five 
articles, two are focused on the manufacturing industry, two on the financial services 
industry, and one on the higher education industry. 
 
Figure 4-3 Industry Distribution of Articles 
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4.2 Description of Thematic Content 
This sub-section delves into the contents of the articles and presents a descriptive account of 
four major components namely 1) methodology employed; 2) political strategy; 3) type of 
performance outcome; and 4) direction of the outcome.   
4.2.1 Political Strategies  
 The political strategies investigated in the selected papers can be grouped into three 
categories: 1) financial; 2) relational; and 3) informational. A few articles study a mix of 
financial and relational strategies. The literature is replete with relational strategies, most of 
which are focused on Asia. Informational strategies are the least studied, and all articles 
focusing on them are based on United States data. Figure 4-4 shows the statistics. 
 
Figure 4-4 CPA Strategies 
4.2.2 Methodology 
From the articles, there are two popular methodologies employed to examine the relationship 
between CPA and firm performance. They are: 1) regression analysis, and 2) event studies. 
Regression analysis is employed in 37 articles, event studies in 14 articles, and a mix of both 
methods in five articles (see Figure 4-5). Hence, regression analysis is the most popular 
method for estimating the benefits of CPA. It recurs in 21 out of the 33 articles focused on 
relational strategy, and in 18 out of the 27 articles focused on the United States. All studies 
share the same philosophical stance; they relate to the positivist paradigm, adopt a realist 
ontology and an empiricist epistemology.  
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Figure 4-5 Methodologies Employed  
4.2.3 Type of Firm Performance Outcomes  
As shown in Figure 4-6, three main types of firm performance outcomes are examined by the 
selected articles: 1) stock performance; 2) operating performance; and 3) policy performance. 
Stock performance, commonly the estimation of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) or 
Buy-and-Hold-Abnormal-Returns (BHARs), was dominant with 20 articles examining this 
type of performance outcome. 13 articles focused on operating performance using accounting 
information such as return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), effective tax rates 
(ETR), and debt ratios. 11 articles examined policy outcomes such as legislations, bailouts, 
government contracts, and anti-dumping proceeds. 11 other articles focused on a mix of stock 
and operating performances while one article focused on a mix of policy influence and 
operating performance. Of the 20 articles solely measuring stock performance, 12 study 
relational strategies, and of the 13 solely measuring operating performance, 11 examine 
relational strategies.  
 
Figure 4-6 Types of Performance Outcomes 
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4.2.4 Direction of Firm Performance Outcomes 
In terms of policy performance, 44 articles representing 78.5% of the total sample report a 
positive relationship. In other words, a convincing majority of studies provide evidence to 
suggest that CPA adds value to firms. Of these 44 articles, 25 and 15 examine relational and 
financial strategies respectively. 17, 11, and nine articles solely measure stock performance, 
operating performance, and policy performance respectively. 23 are United States based and 
16 are Asia based. On the flip side, there are seven articles that claim a negative relationship 
between CPA and firm performance. These articles were all published between 2007 and 
2013, and are mostly focused on United States, Italy, China, and Malaysia. Sitting on the 
fence are two United States based articles which find no impact of financial strategies on 
stock performance. Three articles present mixed findings when using different measures of 
firm performance. The statistics are presented in Figure 4-7. 
 
Figure 4-7 Direction of Performance Outcome
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Chapter 5 Thematic Findings 
In this chapter, I summarize the literature’s main findings and arguments on the relationship 
between CPA and firm performance. These findings are presented following the CIMO-logic 
(Denyer et al., 2008) as applied by (Pilbeam et al., 2012). Accordingly, I first present findings 
on the contexts in which the CPA-firm performance relationship have been investigated. In 
doing this, I differentiate between geographic context and the wider institutional or 
nonmarket setting. Second, I address the interventions or political strategies that are used by 
firms. Subsequently, I present evidence on the performance outcomes of CPA. Finally, I 
explore the mechanisms through which CPA strategies impact performance outcomes. 
Figure 5-1 presents the conceptual framework, based on the CIMO-logic, for addressing the 
impact of CPA on firm performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1 Conceptual Framework for Investigating CPA-Firm Performance 
Relationship 
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5.1 The Contexts in which CPA has been investigated 
CPA has been studied in many different contexts. Majority of the studies are country-specific 
and they cover 10 countries in four different continents of the world (Adhikari et al., 2006; 
Claessens et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 2010; Fisman, 2001; Yeh et al., 2013). Other studies 
cover a multitude of countries (Chaney et al., 2011; Faccio, 2006). Different institutional 
configurations and settings motivate the relatively smaller geographical scope of CPA 
research. In some countries such as the United States, the availability of data on campaign 
contributions and “soft money” donations facilitate research. In other countries, this data is 
absent as there are no regulations requiring the disclosure of political spending. As common 
with other studies (Pilbeam et al., 2012), I find that most of the literature cover several 
industries. Only a few focus on specific industries such as financial services (Carretta et al., 
2012; Mian et al., 2010), manufacturing (Dean et al., 1998; Lee and Baik, 2010) and higher 
education (De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006). It is fair to argue that CPA is a common 
practice in most industries, even though its intensity is higher in highly regulated (Hansen 
and Mitchell, 2000) and concentrated (Grier et al., 1994) industries.  
Through a process of abstraction, I discovered seven distinct categories of contextual 
circumstances under which CPA has been investigated. They are largely political and 
economic, and include the following: 1) Globalization and Competition; 2) Regulation; 3) 
Uncertainty and Risk; 4) Economic transition and Privatization; 5) Weak institutional 
development; 6) Political transition; and 7) Management change. Per the reviewed articles, 
the aforementioned circumstances have influenced the practice or study of CPA.  
5.1.1 Globalization and Competitive  
Globalization and competition are among the most cited or implied contexts in the reviewed 
literature. According to Hillman et al. (1999), government has the power to define 
opportunity sets and hence shapes firms’ competitive environments. This consequently 
increases firms’ involvement in policy processes in ways that advance their goals (Hillman, 
2005) or stifle the competition of their rivals, especially foreign firms wanting to enter their 
markets (Marsh, 1998). Globalization has caused trade expansion and opened up new 
markets. International business firms sign investment agreements with foreign country 
governments in order to expand their businesses into new sovereign territories (Schuler et al., 
2002a). Local firms lobby their own governments for protection from foreign competition 
(Lee and Baik, 2010; Evans and Sherlund, 2011). These instances raise the importance of 
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political activity as a conduit for competitive advantage (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). 
Firms seeking to increase their competitiveness through expansion into foreign markets stand 
a better chance of participating in government foreign trade missions when they make “soft 
money” donations (Schuler et al., 2002a). The surge in competition has caused firms to 
acquire political capital (Hersch et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2011), an intangible resource that has 
a positive long-term effect on the fortunes of firms (Hillman, 2005). It is for competitive 
advantage that firms expend efforts on nonmarket strategy (Baron, 1995) and CPA (Lawton 
et al., 2013).  
5.1.2 Regulations 
In attempts to gain sustained competitive advantage, firms focus efforts to influence 
regulations and policy (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Indeed, policy influence runs through most 
of the popular definitions of CPA (Getz, 1997; Hillman et al., 2004). The regulatory context 
is most explored by studies examining policy performance. These studies largely examine 
trade policies (Schuler et al., 2002a; Steagall and Jennings, 1996), subsidies (Wu and Cheng, 
2011), and legislations (McKay and Webb-Yackee, 2007; Mian et al., 2010). As noted by 
Liebman and Reynolds (2006), campaign contributions are able to influence legislation by 
increasing the likelihood that beneficiary politicians would sponsor laws favourable to their 
contributors. Regulation begets CPA, and this perhaps confirms the finding that highly 
regulated industries are more politically active (Hillman, 2005; Kim, 2008). 
5.1.3 Uncertainty and Risk 
Uncertainty reduction is one of the motivations for CPA (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Typically 
in a given year, a large number of issues are formulated into policy and this increases 
uncertainty for firms, culminating in higher transaction costs (Williamson, 1985) of doing 
business. The dependence of firms on external parties creates risk and uncertainty which 
consequently affect their performance (Hillman, 2005). Access to private information and the 
mitigation of policy uncertainty drive political activism of firms (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). 
Firms that are able to get access to the political process are able to influence policy, improve 
their survival chances, boost their competitive advantage, and reduce uncertainty (Hillman et 
al., 1999). Theoretically, uncertainty is posited as a core driver of CPA. However, only a few 
of the reviewed articles explicitly address this context. 
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5.1.4 Economic Transition and Privatization 
Most of the studies focusing on China studied CPA within the context of economic transition 
and privatization. China loosened its stance on communism and began to privatize some of 
her state owned enterprises (SOEs). The government also decentralized SOEs to “promote 
markets and to gradually phase out its central planning function” (Fan et al., 2007, p. 332). 
However, the Chinese government still controlled some aspects of the privatization process 
such as the number of companies that can go public, the number of shares that can be offered 
in a year, and the offer price (Francis et al., 2009). Some articles referred to this as partial 
privatization because the government still retained control (Fan et al., 2007; Tu et al., 2013). 
These controls mean that that politically connected firms could benefit from government 
favours and preferential treatment (Sun et al., 2011), thus generating research interest in the 
value of political connections (Peng and Luo, 2000; Wu et al., 2012b). Typically, privatized 
firms are expected to be independent from government control. In instances where 
government does not relinquish control, conflicting objectives may arise (Boubakri et al., 
2008) and the resultant agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is expected to impact 
firm performance. Privatized firms are perhaps attractive to CPA researchers because of the 
likelihood that they would still be connected to government.   
5.1.5 Weak Institutional Environments 
There are 21 of the reviewed articles that focus on emerging economies including China, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Brazil, Thailand, and Pakistan, and almost all of them address the weak 
institutional environment context. According to Peng and Luo (2000) who examined the 
impact of managerial ties on firm performance, most of the CPA research has taken place in 
western countries, but emerging markets have a fascinating context where social capital will 
more likely compensate for the lack of market supporting institutions. Social capital through 
informal ties with politicians results in political favouritism (Bliss and Gul, 2012) and 
cronyism (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). The absence of strong institutions creates what some 
researchers call “relationship-based capitalism” (Fraser et al., 2006; Adhikari et al., 2006; 
Sun et al., 2011; Bliss and Gul, 2012) where personal connections and relations influence 
policy and determine the market environment. Other studies (Goldman et al., 2009) argue that 
in well-functioning legal systems, economic gains are not expected to accrue to politically 
connected firms because politicians could face legal and political costs if they favour firms 
for private reasons than for public merit. Obviously, institutions affect the behaviour of actors 
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in the policy process (Barron, 2011) and influence the magnitude of benefits from CPA 
(Faccio, 2006). Government control of China’s securities market presents distinctive 
institutional features that affect the performance of firms (Francis et al., 2009). Anti-
corruption reforms by the Malaysian government transformed the institutional environment 
and inspired a study of whether private gains continued to exist through political connections 
(Imai, 2006). Weak systems of check and balance are institutional voids that allow politicians 
and firms to extract economic rents and encourage business owners to enter politics for 
private gains (Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009). Some of the studies examined 
CPA in high corruption contexts where “social lending” (Khwaja and Mian, 2005) or “memo-
lending” (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006) are prevalent. Among a host of reasons, Claessens 
et al. (2008) found Brazil an interesting context to examine CPA due to its limited level of 
institutional development.  
 It is worth mentioning that the institutional context affects the type of CPA data collected. In 
countries where laws regulate CPA, data is relatively easier to collect. For instance, the 
availability of campaign finance data in the US facilitates CPA research. Similarly, Claessens 
et al. (2008) are able to investigate CPA in Brazil because Brazilian laws mandate that 
campaign contributions are recorded. Holistically, studies addressing the institutional context 
of CPA touch on the many facets of the topic including how institutions shape the nature of 
political activity (Hillman and Keim, 1995; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Barron, 2011) and firm 
performance outcomes (Faccio, 2006; Kim, 2008). The search for new evidence and the 
eagerness for theory development and elaboration makes researchers adopt the institutional 
context where the emphasis is on developing and emerging economies. According to Doh et 
al. (2012), institutional perspectives will have more relevance for CPA research due to the 
importance of emergent economies for international business firms. 
5.1.6 Political Transition 
The change or transition of political power from one administration to the other has received 
some attention in the CPA literature. Three of the selected articles examined power change in 
the United States and Taiwan. These studies measured the impact of transitions on the value 
of politically connected firms. Brown (1996) studied the assassination of President Kennedy 
while Jayachandran (2006) examined the value implications of Senator Jim Jefford’s switch 
from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party. Yeh et al. (2013), who consider Taiwan’s 
2000 and 2004 elections as external shocks, investigated the outcomes of the elections on the 
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performance of connected firms. Generally, these studies dwell on political shifts and how 
the “change of guard” affects the fortunes of firms. The sudden death of politicians (Roberts, 
1990; Faccio and Parsley, 2009) or bad news about the health of politicians (Fisman, 2001) 
reveals the sensitivity of firm value to political ties. 
5.1.7 Management Change 
Only one article (McGuire et al., 1988) studied CPA in the context of Management change. 
Management changes may trigger stock market reactions (Worrell and Davidson III, 1987), 
but these reactions vary depending on the intended destinations of outgoing managers. The 
appointment of top executives to political positions would elicit a stock market response 
different from the appointment of top executives to other positions that are not political 
(McGuire et al., 1988). Getz (1993) argues that the appointment of executives to political 
service may confer political benefits on firms. While McGuire et al.’s (1988) study may 
strike a similarity with Hillman et al.’s (1999) “personal service” and Bunkanwanicha and 
Wiwattanakantang’s (2009) study, its context is distinct because it compares the value 
implications of political changes and non-political changes.  
As shown in Figure 5-2, these contexts are more prevalent in some countries than in others. 
Articles that are set within weak institutional environments, economic transition and 
privatization contexts are mostly focused on emerging and developing countries. 
Globalization, competition, and regulation are popular contexts in developed or industrialized 
countries. Political transition is common between both worlds. 
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Figure 5-2 Geography and Contexts of CPA Research 
 
5.2 Political Strategies used as Interventions in CPA  
The strategic interventions used by firms to influence their policy environments and sustain 
competitive advantage can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) financial strategies; 2) 
relational strategies; and 3) informational strategies (Figure 5-1). These strategies are applied 
in the above-discussed contexts for the sole purpose of shaping the competitive space and 
improving firm performance (Hillman et al., 1999).  
5.2.1 Financial Strategies 
The financial strategies mostly studied in CPA include political action committee (PAC) and 
“soft money” contributions. They are meant to provide financial incentives to politicians 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999) and enable firms to gain access to decision makers (Witko, 2011). 
While it may seem that PAC contributions and “soft money” mean the same thing, the two 
are technically different (Ansolabehere et al., 2004). Soft money contributions are non-
candidate specific donations from individuals, corporations and special interest groups to 
political parties (Cooper et al., 2010). They are for broad party building purposes and not for 
the promotion of specific candidates (Schuler et al., 2002a). As noted by Hersch et al. (2008), 
while PAC contributions are made to specific candidates, “soft money” contributions are 
made to political parties. “Soft money” contributions are advantageous because they are not 
highly regulated or restricted, have no caps (Schuler et al., 2002a), and can be targeted at the 
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executive branch where key policy decisions are evolved. “Soft money” contributions were 
used by firms until the 2000s when it became illegal to make such donations (Hadani and 
Schuler, 2013). Hence, most of the literature on financial strategies examine PAC 
contributions, which unlike “soft money”, are highly regulated and capped (Schuler et al., 
2002a). While most studies fail to make the distinction between the two types of 
contributions, a few do. For instance, Hadani and Schuler (2013) collectively term both 
contributions “corporate political investments”. Schuler et al. (2002a), on the other hand, 
makes a rare distinction between them. Other studies (Kim, 2008; Hadani and Schuler, 2013) 
examined lobbying expenditures which are also technically different from PAC and “soft 
money” contributions. There are 18 studies that solely examine financial strategies, mostly 
PAC contributions.  
5.2.2 Relational Strategies 
This is perhaps the most complex and subjective of all political strategies in the reviewed 
literature. Generally, this strategy is about firms establishing relationships with politicians 
mostly through co-opting them into corporate boards (Hillman, 2005; Goldman et al., 2009; 
Carretta et al., 2012; Hadani and Schuler, 2013), through business executives and top 
shareholders entering politics (McGuire et al., 1988; Hillman et al., 1999; Kim, 2008), or 
through informal relations (Adhikari et al., 2006; Fraser et al., 2006). The common construct 
used here is “political connections” or “politically connected firms” which is defined 
differently by different authors. Table 5-1 presents a summary of some key definitions of 
political connectedness in the literature. It can be seen that there is subjectivity in the 
definition of the construct “political connections”. While some studies (Faccio et al., 2006; 
Chaney et al., 2011) cast a wider net through broad framing of the construct, others adopt a 
narrow focus (Adhikari et al., 2006; Hassan et al., 2012). The broader definitions are able to 
capture data at all levels of the political echelon, but only when such data is obtainable. There 
is difficulty in collecting data about firms’ political connectedness because this information is 
private, protected and hardly available to the public (Hassan et al., 2012). Relational 
strategies have a significant bearing on corporate governance, especially on top management 
teams. 
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Table 5-1 Definitions of Political Connections 
Study Definition of Political Connection 
Adhikari et al. (2006) 
"a firm's directors or major shareholders have informal ties with 
leading politicians through personal encounters" 
Boubakri et al. (2012) 
“a company is politically-connected if at least one member of its 
board of directors (BOD) or its supervisory board is or was a 
politician, that is, a member of parliament, a minister or any other 
top appointed-bureaucrat” 
Chaney et al. (2011) 
“A company is classified as politically connected if, at some point 
between 1997 and 2001, at least one of its large shareholders 
(anybody directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of votes) or 
top directors (CEO, chairman of the board, president, vice-
president, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister or a 
head of state, or is tightly related to a politician or party.” 
Faccio et al. (2006) 
“a company is defined as politically connected if at least one of its 
top officers (defined as the company’s chief executive officer, 
chairman of the board (COB), president, vice-president, or 
secretary of the board) or a large shareholder (defined as anyone 
controlling at least 10% of the company’s voting shares) was head 
of state (i.e., president, king, or prime minister), a government 
minister (as defined below), or a member of the national 
parliament, as of the beginning of 1997.” 
Faccio (2006) 
“a company is connected with a politician if one of the company’s 
large shareholders or top officers is: (a) a member of parliament 
(MP), (b) a minister or the head of state, or (c) closely related to a 
top official.” 
Hassan et al. (2012) Firms linked to the prime minister and deputy prime minister 
Sun et al. (2011) 
Firms with "ownership ties to the Shanghai government and board 
members with career experience in municipal government" 
Wu et al. (2012) 
“We define a CEO as politically connected if he or she is currently 
serving or formerly served in the government or military.” 
Yeh (2013) 
“(1) the firm was founded or run by the political party; (2) the 
political party is one of the firm's large shareholders; (3) the 
chairman or CEO publicly supports the presidential candidate 
representing a certain political party, participates in or has his/her 
employees participate in the presidential campaign or was 
described by at least one major newspaper as being supportive of a 
certain political party; and (4) one of the firm's large shareholders, 
directors or top officers is/was a member of parliament, a minister 
or a top government official” 
 
Political connections are a valuable resource (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Faccio, 2006; 
Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010) which reduce uncertainty (Hillman et al., 1999) and allow firms to 
gain private information about policy (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). These benefits, among 
others, confer a competitive advantage on connected firms over their unconnected peers 
through the process of rent extraction from government (Hassan et al., 2012). Relational 
strategies are the most studied in the reviewed literature; 33 out of 56 articles solely focus on 
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these strategies. Perhaps, their dominance in the CPA field is attributed to their prevalence in 
most parts of the world.  
5.2.3 Informational Strategies 
Before laws and regulations are passed and implemented, they are first drafted into proposals 
for approval. At this stage, firms and other interest groups are able to make inputs by 
providing specific information about policy preferences to decision makers (Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999). According to McKay and Webb-Yackee (2007), competing interests battle it out 
to influence policy decisions and agency actions, particularly to instigate the imposition of 
trade barriers and trade protection from foreign competition (Marsh, 1998). Informational 
strategies include lobbying (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; De Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001; Lo, 
2003), petitions (Marsh, 1998) and comments (McKay and Webb-Yackee, 2007). From the 
reviewed articles, these strategies are not targeted at politicians, but at government agencies 
where key policy issues are initiated and drafted into proposals for parliamentary and 
executive approval. Information strategies are the least investigated CPA 
strategies/interventions. 
5.3 Firm Performance Outcomes of CPA 
There are three distinct categories of firm performance outcomes as shown in Figure 5-1. 
Stock market performance entails the measurement of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
and Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns (BHARS). The popular methodology used to measure 
this type of firm performance is event study (Brown and Warner, 1980). With this method, 
the reaction of stock markets to political events relating to firms is investigated, and such 
events include the appointment of politicians to corporate boards (Hillman, 2005; Goldman et 
al., 2009; Carretta et al., 2012; Hadani and Schuler, 2013), the sudden death of politicians 
(Brown, 1996) and the transition of political power (Jayachandran, 2006; Yeh et al., 2013). 
Other stock market performance variables include Tobin q (Wu et al., 2012a) and cost of 
equity (Boubakri et al., 2012b). Key to event study methodology is the assumption that 
capital markets are efficient (Brown and Warner, 1980). This assumption cannot be met in 
under-developed capital markets, hence the few studies applying this method in investigating 
political connections in Asia.   
Operating performance draws on accounting data contained in annual reports. While 
variables and ratios such as return on sales (ROS) (Fan et al., 2007; Hadani and Schuler, 
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2013), return on investment (ROI) (Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010; Mathur and Singh, 2011), 
effective tax rates (ETR) (Adhikari et al., 2006; Richter et al., 2009), cost of debt (Bliss and 
Gul, 2012), leverage (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Fraser et al., 2006), accruals quality (Chaney 
et al., 2011), and interest revenues (Carretta et al., 2012) have been used to measure operating 
performance, the popular variables include return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE). Operating performance variables are “backward looking” and hardly capture 
intangible political capital (Hillman, 2005). Hence, they could be misleading. 
As common with previous reviews (Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 2011), the impact of 
interest groups and firms on policy is another outcome of CPA. However policy performance, 
which measures the performance of firms in the policy arena, is the least studied of all the 
outcomes in the literature. Articles examining this type of outcome either study the voting 
patterns of politicians (Liebman and Reynolds, 2006), the difference between proposed and 
adopted agency rules (McKay and Webb-Yackee, 2007), government bailouts (Faccio et al., 
2006) or the outcomes of petitions (Marsh, 1998; Lee and Baik, 2010). Some of the studies 
(Wu et al., 2012b) report multiple outcomes. Operating and policy performances are 
measured largely through regression analysis.  
Table 5-2 summarizes the key constructs and variables that have been used to measure 
performance in the literature. 
Table 5-2 Performance Outcome Constructs and Variables 
Outcome Construct Variable(s) Key Studies 
Access to finance leverage, interest rates 
Claessens et al. (2008); Yeh et al. (2012); 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) 
Trade expansion Sales Lu (2011) 
Operating performance 
ROA, ROE, ROI, ETR, 
interest revenues, debt 
maturity, acquisition 
premium, interest rates 
Peng and Luo (2000); Bliss and Gul 
(2012); Richter et al. (2009); Mathur and 
Singh (2011) 
Stock performance 
CARs, BHARs, Cost of 
equity 
Hillman (2005); Cooper et al. (2010); 
Boubakri et al. (2012b); Goldman et al. 
(2010); Hadani and Schuler (2013) 
 Government contracts Witko (2011) 
 Anti-dumping proceeds Lee and Baik (2010) 
 
Trade mission 
participation Schuler et al. (2002a) 
 Roll call voting 
Liebman and Reynolds (2006); 
McKay and Webb-Yackee (2007) 
 Government bailout Faccio et al. (2006) 
 Academic earmarks De Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) 
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5.3.1 Positive Performance Outcomes 
The reviewed literature suggests that there is a positive relationship between CPA and firm 
performance. 44 of the 56 studies provide evidence to show that CPA adds value to the firm. 
In Malaysia, Adhikari et al. (2006) found that politically connected firms pay lower effective 
taxes than nonconnected firms. This finding is consistent with Richter et al. (2009) who 
reported that in the United States, firms that lobby more in a given year pay lower effective 
tax rates in the next year. Wu et al. (2012b) also reported similar evidence for China where 
firms with politically connected managers pay lower tax rates. Politically connected firms 
have easier and preferential access to financing (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Fraser et 
al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008; Boubakri et al., 2012a; Hassan et al., 2012), are highly 
leveraged (Fraser et al., 2006), and have longer debt maturities (Boubakri et al., 2012a). 
Political connections are reported to facilitate trade expansion (Lu, 2011), increase the 
likelihood of government bailout (Faccio et al., 2006) and allow firms to pay relatively lower 
premiums for privatization targets (Tu et al., 2013). Campaign contributions are found to 
increase the number of government contracts received (Witko, 2011), the likelihood to 
participate in foreign trade missions (Schuler et al., 2002a) and the likelihood of legislators to 
support favourable laws (Liebman and Reynolds, 2006). Lobbying is associated with higher 
academic earmarks (De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006), antidumping regulations and 
increased market value of firms (Marsh, 1998). Comments and petitions shift policy towards 
the preferred position of the firm (McKay and Webb-Yackee, 2007). The appointment of 
politicians to corporate boards triggers positive stock market reactions (Hillman, 2005). 
Similarly, Cooper at al. (2010) found that campaign contributions are positively and 
significantly related to future abnormal returns. Peng and Luo (2000) and Imai (2006) posit 
that political connections are positively related to ROA. Most of the studies claim a positive 
relationship between CPA and operating performance.  
5.3.2 Negative Performance Outcomes  
While majority of the literature found a positive CPA-firm performance relationship, there 
are seven studies which report evidence to the contrary. Using United States data, Aggarwal 
et al. (2011) found that “soft money” donations are negatively correlated with returns. They 
also found that donating firms acquire more and record lower abnormal returns on acquisition 
announcements. Similarly, Hadani and Schuler (2013) provided evidence to suggest that CPA 
has a negative impact on market value. Politically connected firms record poor accounting 
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performance after privatization (Boubakri et al., 2008) and after initial public offerings (Fan 
et al., 2007). Connected firms also have poor accruals quality (Chaney et al., 2011) and are 
charged higher interest rates on loans (Bliss and Gul, 2012). Moreover, politicians on boards 
of Italian banks exert a negative impact on interest revenues, loan quality, and capitalization 
level (Carretta et al., 2012).  
5.3.3 No Impact and Mixed Outcomes 
Two studies do not find any significant relationship between CPA and firm performance. 
Ansolabehere et al. (2004) found no benefits from campaign donations while Hersch et al. 
(2008) argue that campaign contributions do not create any financial capital. Three studies 
measured multiple outcomes and reported mixed outcomes. According to Faccio et al. 
(2006), while politically connected firms are able to influence bailout policies to favour them, 
they record poor operating performance. Similarly, Tu et al. (2013) reported that while 
connected firms pay lower premium for quality firms during privatization, they record lower 
operating and stock performance in the post privatization period.  
In summary, empirical evidence suggests that CPA is positively related to firm performance. 
However, the few studies reporting contrary evidence seem to cast a doubt on this stance. As 
argued by Hadani and Schuler (2013) and suggested by Lux et al. (2011), the evidence is not 
complete and further studies are required.      
5.4 Theoretical Mechanisms Underpinning the CPA-Firm Performance 
Relationship 
Five theoretical mechanisms through which CPA impacts firm performance are identified in 
the literature. They include resource-based view (RBV) (Barney, 1991), agency (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), resource dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), institutional (Scott, 
2005) and social capital theories. Some of these mechanisms are explicitly cited while others 
are implied from the arguments put forward by the studies. These mechanisms are presented 
in Figure 5-1. 
Social capital is the most frequently used theoretical lens for explaining the outcomes of 
CPA, though it is mostly implied. The establishment of political connections enables firms to 
build social capital which enables them to extract rent from government. These rents are in 
the form of preferential access to finance (Claessens et al., 2008; Yeh et al., 2013) or 
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government contracts (Witko, 2011). Social or political capital is more pronounced in 
relationship-based capitalisms (Adhikari et al., 2006; Fraser et al., 2006; Bliss and Gul, 2012) 
where favouritism and cronyism (Johnson and Mitton, 2003) abound. Personal level political 
capital adds value to firms (Sun et al., 2011) and informal connections allow government to 
confer private benefits on firms (Fraser et al., 2006). Campaign contributions also build social 
capital and facilitate access to politicians (Kim, 2008; Witko, 2011). Drawing on RBV, some 
studies argue that the co-optation of directors into corporate boards adds to the resource base 
of firms (Hillman, 2005) and this allows them to exploit their policy environments (Niessen 
and Ruenzi, 2010). 
While social capital and RBV theories are mostly associated with the positive outcomes of 
CPA, agency theory is applied to explicate both positive and negative outcomes. For instance, 
Hadani and Schuler (2013) argue that because firms are not required to disclose political 
spending, information asymmetry occurs between managers and shareholders and this leads 
to negative firm performance. They also posit that managers could pursue CPA for self-
aggrandizement. Clearly, this represents a misalignment of interests between managers and 
shareholders. Political connections may create an agency problem where politicians use firms 
to pursue political and social goals to the detriment of shareholder value (Fan et al., 2007; Wu 
et al., 2012a). Political spending may also be unprofitable investments which add no value to 
the firm (Ansolabehere et al., 2004; Hersch et al., 2008). On the flipside, Jayachandran 
(2006) suggests that firms target their contributions towards politicians with interests aligned 
to theirs. This ensures that when elected, the politician invariably pursues the interests of the 
firm. In federal agency rule making, firms comment and petition so as to make their policy 
preferences known to regulators and policymakers, and in order to avoid litigations agencies 
align their interests with those of the majority commenters (McKay and Webb-Yackee, 
2007). Politicians on corporate boards may extract rent from firms (Carretta et al., 2012) or 
extend government rents to firms (Hillman, 2005). The entry of business executives into 
politics is motivated by several reasons which include the alignment of interests and rent 
extraction (Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009). 
Majority of the studies in emerging and transition economies point to cronyism and 
favouritism (Johnson and Mitton, 2003) and corruption (Khwaja and Mian, 2005) as 
mechanisms through which political connections affect firm performance. Faccio et al. 
(2006) found that the value of political ties is higher in corrupt countries. Similarly, Fisman 
(2001) argue that corruption influences the size of political rents. Poor institutional 
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development results in weak systems of checks and balances (Bunkanwanicha and 
Wiwattanakantang, 2009) and the prevalence of relationship-based capital systems (Fraser et 
al., 2006) which allow for private benefits to be obtained. In China where the government 
controls many aspects of the stock market (Francis et al., 2009) and allocates resources (Peng 
and Luo, 2000), there is incentive for preferential treatment to be accorded to politically 
connected firms (Wu et al., 2012b; Yeh et al., 2013). Institutional theory thus underlies most 
of the CPA studies in developing countries. 
Resource dependency posits that firms co-opt external dependencies in order to reduce 
uncertainty (Hillman, 2005). However, the resource dependence logic adopted by the 
literature to explain the mechanism through which CPA impacts performance includes 
another element. Here, the focus is on coercion or the yielding of other market actors to the 
demands of politically connected firms. The dependence of other market actors on 
government makes them yield to political pressures and extend favourable treatment to 
politically connected firms (Faccio et al., 2006). In a study of Pakistani banks, Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) argue that politicians are able to threaten bank officials with transfers, removals, 
or promotions if they do not yield to their demands. This institutional lapse coupled with 
corruption makes politically connected firms have their way with regards to preferential 
lending (Claessens et al., 2008)  and low or no collaterals on lending (Yeh et al., 2013). 
Interestingly, while risk and uncertainty are contexts within which CPA is examined, they are 
also a mechanism that determines CPA outcomes. Bliss and Gul (2012) argue that politically 
connected firms are charged higher interest rates due to their perceived riskiness. This finding 
is corroborated by Fraser at al. (2006) and Claessens et al. (2008) who found that connected 
firms carry more debt. High leverage increases financial distress and the risk of bankruptcy, 
hence higher interest rates on loans (Bliss and Gul, 2012). 
Table 5-3 Summary of Theoretical Mechanisms 
Theory Explanation of Mechanism 
Resourced based view 
theory Changes in resources and dynamic capabilities 
Agency theory 
Mis/alignment of business and political interests; mis/alignment of 
managerial and shareholder interests; un/profitable investments; 
managerial self-aggrandizement 
Resource dependency 
theory 
Co-optation of external dependencies; yielding to the pressures of 
dependencies 
Institutional theory Corruption & cronyism; changes to institutional barriers 
Social capital/network 
theory Preferential treatment; influence, and access to government 
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5.5 Summary 
This sub-section provides a summative account of the findings presented above. CPA has 
been studied in seven contexts namely: competition and globalization; regulation; uncertainty 
and risk; economic transition and privatization; weak institutional environments; political 
transition; and management change. The studies cover a number of countries but mainly in 
the United States, China, and Malaysia. Within these contexts, three categories of 
interventions or political strategies are used to influence the policy and nonmarket 
environments. They are financial; relational; and informational strategies. These strategies are 
implemented to shape the competitive space and add value to firms. However, the results 
suggest that these strategies do not always deliver value. While majority of the studies found 
that CPA is positively related with different variables of firm performance, a few found no 
significant relationship or a negative relationship. Performance outcomes are measured in 
three different ways. First is stock performance which examines market value. Second is 
operating performance which considers accounting information. The third, policy 
performance, explores the extent to which firms are able to influence policy. The literature 
suggests five main theoretical mechanisms that underpin the CPA-firm performance 
relationship. RBV, agency, resource dependency, institutional and social capital theories have 
been explicitly or implicitly used to explicate the ways through which CPA impacts 
performance. Of all these mechanisms, social capital is the most cited/implied. 
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Chapter 6 Synthesis of Thematic Findings 
After having presented the findings of this review according to the CIMO-logic (Denyer et 
al., 2008), I now synthesize these findings to evolve a coherent understanding of the 
relationship between CPA and firm performance. The foremost argument that can be drawn 
from the literature is that CPA adds value to firms. It improves stock and operating 
performance (Claessens et al., 2008) and influences policy outcomes (McKay and Webb-
Yackee, 2007). 
6.1 The Impact of Context on Intervention/Political Strategy Selection 
Indeed, the context within which CPA is done or investigated seems to have an impact on the 
choice of strategy. First, financial strategies involving PAC and “soft money” contributions 
are dominant in the United States. Only a few countries in the world have laws which require 
that information on donations to political parties and candidates are made public (Claessens 
et al., 2008). All the studies that investigate financial strategies are based on United States 
data with the exception of one (Claessens et al., 2008) which is focused on campaign 
contributions in Brazil. It needs mentioning that Brazil is one of those few countries that have 
laws governing campaign finance. This observation does not only strike an accord with 
geographical contexts, but relates strongly to the weak institutional environment context as 
well. In countries with strong legal systems where laws are enacted to guide and control 
political activism which includes corporate political donations, it is relatively easier to 
observe and gather information on campaign contributions. Similarly, in countries where 
there are laws that govern the rulemaking process, it is easier to investigate information 
strategies. As noted by McKay and Webb-Yackee (2007) for the United States, the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 requires all agencies to publicly publish proposed rules 
and solicit comments from the public before adopting them. This “notice and comment” 
window (McKay and Webb-Yackee, 2007) provides opportunity for firms to influence the 
final rules (Lo, 2003). On the flip side, there are hardly any of such regulations in countries 
with weak legal systems and this makes it difficult or impossible for firms to use or for 
researchers to study informational strategies in those contexts. It is therefore plausible to 
argue that financial and informational strategies are impacted by the level of institutional 
development and national regulation. 
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Relational strategies are studied in many different geographical contexts, from developing to 
developed countries, emerging to industrialized countries, and capitalist to transition 
economies. Whilst these strategies are common across the globe, they are more prevalent in 
emerging countries where institutional development is weak and fragile (Wu and Cheng, 
2011). The ease with which rents can be extracted from political patronage in emerging 
countries encourages business owners to enter politics or firms to connect with politicians for 
private benefits (Imai, 2006; Fraser et al., 2006; Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 
2009; Hassan et al., 2012). Wu and Cheng (2011) argue that political connections play a 
much more important role in emerging markets than in developed markets due to the 
existence of institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) in the former. In China which is 
an emerging and transition country, the government plays an important role in resource 
allocation (Peng and Luo, 2000). Owing to the enormous influence of central governments 
and their unpredictability, firms establish relationships to manage the risk (Hillman et al., 
1999) and to gain access to government controlled resources (Wu and Cheng, 2011). The 
literature also cites that political connections, formal and informal, are more prevalent in 
“relationship-based capitalisms” (Fraser et al., 2006) where cronyism and personal 
relationships determine the allocation of capital resources (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). 
Malaysia (Adhikari et al., 2006; Bliss and Gul, 2012) and China (Sun et al., 2011) are the 
commonly tagged relationship-based economies. 
Competition and globalization are the contexts that do not seem to impact particular 
strategies but all of them. The search for superior and sustainable competitive advantage that 
will improve the value of firms drives managers into CPA (Hillman et al., 1999). Influencing 
the nonmarket shapes the competitive environment (Lawton et al., 2013) and improves the 
overall performance of firms (Baron, 1999). Political strategies are alternatives. Depending 
on the context and appropriateness, individual or multiple strategies are implemented 
(Schuler et al., 2002b). Hence it difficult to determine what specific strategies are used in 
highly competitive contexts. Perhaps, future scholarship could explore this. As shown in 
Figure 6-1, competition and globalization are the overarching contexts of CPA. Some 
strategies are common in some contexts and this signals the existence of contextual impact on 
choice of political strategy. 
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Figure 6-1 Impact of Context on Strategy Selection 
 
6.2 The Impact of Context on Performance Outcomes 
From the literature, there seems to be a connection between context and firm performance 
outcomes. 21 of the 56 studies are focused on CPA in Asia and South America. Majority of 
these studies argue that CPA improves firm performance. However, two studies (Fan et al., 
2007; Bliss and Gul, 2012) reported a negative impact of CPA on performance in Malaysia 
and China. Similarly two studies (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Hadani and Schuler, 2013) reported 
negative outcomes of CPA in the United States. Two other studies (Ansolabehere et al., 2004; 
Hersch et al., 2008) found no significant impact. The only study focused on Italy found that 
political connections have a negative impact on bank performance (Carretta et al., 2012). In 
Brazil however, Claessens et al. (2008) found that campaign contributions positively impact 
stock and operating performances. The mixed findings across different countries suggest that 
institutional characteristics could have a bearing on CPA outcomes. Figure 6-2 shows the 
continental distribution of the reviewed literature, and the performance outcome directions (+ 
for positive; - for negative; O for no impact). 
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Figure 6-2 Geographical Distribution of Performance Outcome Directions 
 
6.3 Intervention and Performance Outcomes 
Financial strategies are associated with mixed outcomes, even though majority of the studies 
examining these strategies found a positive relationship between CPA and performance. Two 
studies (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Hadani and Schuler, 2013) and another (Hersch et al., 2008) 
provide evidence to respectively suggest a negative and a no significant impact of financial 
strategies on stock and operating performances. Most of the financial strategies measure 
policy and stock performances. In contrast, majority of studies investigating relational 
strategies measure operating and stock performances. They also report a positive CPA-firm 
performance relationship except for a few (Boubakri et al., 2008; Chaney et al., 2011; Bliss 
and Gul, 2012; Carretta et al., 2012) who reported negative outcomes. The only strategy that 
has a unanimous positive relationship with performance outcomes is informational strategy. It 
can thus be argued that firms should exert more effort in the policy arena where the chances 
of success are high. In Table 6-1, I summarize the dominant performance outcome types and 
dominant performance outcome directions for each of the three CPA strategies.  
Table 6-1 Intervention-Performance Outcomes 
Strategy Dominant Outcome Type Dominant Outcome Direction 
Financial Policy Influence Positive 
Relational Operating performance Positive 
Informational Stock performance Positive 
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6.4 Outcome Type and Outcome Direction 
Mixed findings are found for operating and stock performances, though the outcomes are 
largely positive. Operating performance records the most negative outcomes. Studies found 
that politically connected firms are charged higher interest rates on loans (Bliss and Gul, 
2012), have low accruals quality (Chaney et al., 2011) and poor ROS (Hadani and Schuler, 
2013). Connected banks have poor loan portfolios and record low interest revenues (Carretta 
et al., 2012). Other studies reached similar conclusions for operating performance (Faccio et 
al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007). Using abnormal returns and market value, a couple of studies 
found that CPA has a negative impact (Fan et al., 2007; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Hadani and 
Schuler, 2013) and a non-significant impact (Ansolabehere et al., 2004; Hersch et al., 2008) 
on stock performance  Interestingly, all studies investigating policy performance found that 
CPA is able to influence policy decisions in ways favourable to the firm. For instance, 
contributions influence senate roll call vote (Steagall and Jennings, 1996; Liebman and 
Reynolds, 2006; Mian et al., 2010) while political connections shape government subsidy 
decisions (Lee and Baik, 2010; Wu and Cheng, 2011) and protect firms from competition 
(Evans and Sherlund, 2011). At this juncture, it is plausible to argue based on the literature 
that informational strategies and any other strategies targeted at policy influence are usually 
successful without any negative outcomes.  
In Figure 6-3, solid lines show the dominant relationship between outcome type and outcome 
direction. The broken lines show the other relationships as suggested by the literature. It can 
be seen that policy performance does not have any relationships with other directions except 
the positive direction. 
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6.5 The CIMO-logic of CPA and Firm Performance 
To draw the larger picture, two contexts namely economic transition and privatization, and 
weak institutional environments are treated as contexts for developing countries as suggested 
in the literature. Competition, uncertainty and regulation are common contexts in developed 
countries. The common strategy in developing countries is the relational strategy where firms 
establish connections with politicians (Bliss and Gul, 2012; Boubakri et al., 2012a; Yeh et al., 
2013). In developed countries, financial and informational strategies are popular. Perhaps, 
this is because developed countries have laws that regulate political spending (Schuler et al., 
2002a) and the policymaking process (McKay and Webb-Yackee, 2007), allowing firms to 
participate in political and policy issues. Examining three broad categories of firm 
performance, there is overwhelming evidence that CPA leads to positive outcomes. As shown 
in Figure 6-4, relational strategies affect performance outcomes mainly through three 
theoretical mechanisms namely social capital, agency and institutional theories. Connections 
to politicians create political capital and this confers benefits on firms (Sun et al., 2011; Wu 
et al., 2012b). Relational strategies also allow connected firms to extract rents through 
cronyism and corruption (Johnson and Mitton, 2003) especially in relationship-based capital 
systems (Adhikari et al., 2006) where institutional development is weak. Moreover, the 
dependency of other actors on government makes them yield to the demands and pressures of 
politically connected firms (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006). Similar to 
relational strategies, financial strategies build social capital and align the interests of firms 
with those of regulators. For instance, contributions grant firms with access to politicians 
(Kim, 2008) and enables firms to have politicians act in their favour (Steagall and Jennings, 
1996; Mian et al., 2010).  
In the literature, social capital and institutional theories are commonly used to explicate stock 
and operating performances while resource dependency is applied to largely explain 
operating performance. Agency theory is popular with policy performance, but has also been 
used to explain stock and operating performances. 
 
 
 
55 | P a g e  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-4 Empirically Derived CIMO Framework of CPA 
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Chapter 7 Discussion 
Investigation of the literature on how CPA impacts firm performance reveals that there is a 
general view that CPA impacts firm performance positively (Hillman, 2005; Adhikari et al., 
2006; Claessens et al., 2008). Going by the empirical evidence from this review, suffice it to 
argue that the advocacy for nonmarket strategy (Baron, 1995) and CPA (Lawton et al., 2013) 
is justified. The findings corroborate other studies (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; McWilliams et 
al., 2002; Bonardi et al., 2006; Capron and Chatain, 2008) which suggest that CPA adds 
value to firms, and strengthen Bernhagen and Brauninger’s (2005) claim that policy decisions 
are positively skewed towards business interests. However, there are pockets of studies that 
report evidence to the contrary (Fan et al., 2007; Bliss and Gul, 2012; Hadani and Schuler, 
2013). It is therefore not surprising that our understanding of CPA outcomes remains 
incomplete and inconclusive (Hadani and Schuler, 2013), and this calls for further research 
on the topic (Lux et al., 2011). In this section, I discuss the key insights, point out their 
limitations, and make suggestions for further research. Consequently, I define the academic 
contribution of this thesis and the practical implications of the findings. 
It can be seen from the CIMO framework of CPA (Figure 6-4) that in the contexts of 
economic transition, privatization and weak institutional environments, relational strategies 
are popular. Political connections are commonly used by firms to extract political rents. In 
contrast to the developed world where competition, globalization, regulation, and risk are 
dominant contexts of CPA studies, financial and informational strategies are the prevalent 
instruments firms use to shape their policy environments. There is an overlap of strategies in 
all of these contexts but the most popular ones per contexts are those I focus on. In the 
literature, relational strategies affect mostly operating and stock performances while financial 
and informational strategies affect all three performance outcomes. It therefore follows that in 
the context of the developing world, operating and stock performances are those impacted by 
CPA. Consequently, the following propositions linking contexts, interventions and outcomes 
are offered: 
Proposition 1: In circumstances of economic transition and privatization or in emerging 
countries and weak institutional environments, firms use relational strategies to improve their 
operating or stock performance.   
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Proposition 2: In circumstances of increased competition, globalization, regulation, or risk, 
firms use both financial strategies and informational strategies to influence policy or improve 
their operating or stock performance. 
Relating context to strategy, there are hardly any studies that examine financial and 
informational strategies in developing countries. Most of these strategies are focused on 
United States, except one study (Claessens et al., 2008) which examines political spending in 
Brazil. Similarly, relating context to outcome reveals that policy influence outcomes are 
hardly studied in developing countries. These gaps are worth filling. 
While the linkage between context, strategies and performance outcomes are clear in the 
literature, the theoretical mechanisms by which these strategies exert their influence on firm 
performance outcomes are less clear and are therefore mostly implied from the arguments of 
the authors. The explicit adoption of a theoretical framing for explaining the performance 
outcomes of CPA is largely missing in typical finance studies (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; 
Faccio et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008; Boubakri et al., 2008). However, the studies 
published in management journals are explicitly grounded in theories such as social capital 
(Peng and Luo, 2000), agency theory (Hadani and Schuler, 2013), and resource dependency 
theory (Hillman et al., 1999; Hillman, 2005; Carretta et al., 2012). It therefore seems that 
while core economics and finance literature, which dominate in this review, are more biased 
towards answering only the “what” question, management literature answer both the “what” 
and “how” questions with respect to the outcomes of CPA and are thus more insightful. 
Explicating the mechanisms through which CPA affects firm performance deepens our 
understanding of the topic (Dean et al., 1998; Hillman et al., 1999; Adhikari et al., 2006). 
 There is a controversy with respect to the impact of political connections or political capital 
on perceived risk of the firm. Connected firms are highly leveraged (Fraser et al., 2006) and 
are more susceptible to the risk of financial distress. Corporate risk taking is higher for 
politically connected firms because they are more likely to be less conservative in their 
investment choices (Boubakri et al., 2013). This risk is penalized through high interest rates 
on loans (Bliss and Gul, 2012) which exert a negative impact on operating performance. 
However there is a tendency for political connections to serve as government guarantees and 
hence reduce the risk of doing business with connected firms (Faccio et al., 2006; Niessen 
and Ruenzi, 2010; Boubakri et al., 2012b). Perhaps, this also explains the preferential 
treatments granted to politically connected firms (Claessens et al., 2008; Yeh et al., 2013). It 
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is therefore obvious that as much as our understanding of the relationship between CPA and 
firm performance is incomplete, so is the impact of CPA on perceived risk of the firm. 
The CPA literature body is replete with studies on antecedents (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000; 
Hersch and McDougall, 2000; Hillman, 2003; Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton et al., 2012), 
strategies (Keim and Zeithaml, 1986; Hillman and Hitt, 1999) and conceptions/theory 
(Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Hillman and Keim, 1995; Bonardi and Keim, 2005; Bonardi 
et al., 2005; Capron and Chatain, 2008; Barron, 2011). However, the outcomes of CPA are 
among the least studied (Lux et al., 2011). There are many theories that explain why firms 
engage in CPA or why firms conduct CPA in particular ways (Getz, 1997), but only a few 
have been applied to explain CPA outcomes. One theory that is popular with CPA research in 
emerging and developing countries is institutional theory. Evidence from this review suggests 
that the outcomes of CPA may vary with different institutional contexts (Hillman, 2005; Wu 
and Cheng, 2011; Wu et al., 2012a). Meanwhile a scrutiny of the geographical distribution of 
studies on the outcomes of CPA (Figure 6-2) reveals that some regions, especially Australia 
and Africa, remain unexplored. It is therefore difficult to obtain conclusive evidence or to 
make extensive generalizations. 
The outcomes of CPA have been measured in very different ways. Most studies examine 
stock performance (Goldman et al., 2009; Cooper et al., 2010; Huber and Kirchler, 2013) and 
operating performance (Claessens et al., 2008; Chaney et al., 2011; Carretta et al., 2012). 
There are some others that examine academic earmarks (De Figueiredo and Silverman, 
2006), anti-dumping proceeds (Lee and Baik, 2010), government contracts (Witko, 2011), 
bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006), trade mission participation (Schuler et al., 2002a) and 
regulations (McKay and Webb-Yackee, 2007). It is thus evident that CPA outcomes have 
been examined using different variables and constructs, but there is still room for the impact 
of CPA on other performance metrics to be investigated (Lux et al., 2011). 
7.1 Directions for Future Research 
As much as the thematic analysis of the reviewed literature has improved our knowledge of 
the CPA-firm performance relationship, it has also facilitated the identification of gaps in the 
extant literature with respect to contexts, interventions/strategies, mechanisms, and outcomes 
of CPA. Consequently, I propose the following significant avenues for future research.  
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First, there is a dearth of studies that examine informational and financial strategies in 
developing countries. With the exception of a few (Claessens et al., 2008), almost all the 
literature on the aforementioned strategies are focused on United States. There are two 
possible explanations for this observation: 1) it could be the case that studies have 
intentionally or unintentionally overlooked these strategies in the emerging markets contexts 
or 2) these strategies are not used by firms in developing countries. It is however difficult to 
accept the latter reason since everywhere in the world corporations seem to play a role in 
politics. Following from that premise, I propose that future research could investigate not just 
how financial and informational strategies impact firm performance in emerging countries 
but also what their antecedents are and how they are deployed. If there is a view that these 
strategies are invisible or hardly existent in the developing world context, future studies could 
explore how contextual or institutional configurations influence the choice of CPA strategies. 
Different institutional environments could have different influence on CPA outcomes 
(Hillman, 2005), which suggests that studies of CPA outcomes in “virgin regions” such as 
Africa and Australia could help advance the search for conclusive evidence on the topic.    
Second, it can be observed in the literature that there is a bias towards finding the relationship 
between CPA and firm performance, but less emphasis is placed on understanding the 
underlying mechanisms of CPA value creation/destruction. There are only a few studies 
(Peng and Luo, 2000; Hadani and Schuler, 2013) that explicitly discuss mechanisms through 
which political activism impacts firm performance. Consequently, future research could 
attempt to explain the means by which CPA delivers specific outcomes.  
Third, the reviewed literature reveals that empirical studies address corporate involvement in 
the political process mainly at the national level. While it is at this level that most of CPA can 
be seen, it still does not rule out the fact that CPA exists at the local/regional/state levels. For 
instance, in the United States majority of the studies focus on national politics to the neglect 
of State politics, yet State governments have authority to enact laws and pass regulations that 
can affect the firm. Similarly in developing countries, local governments have the authority to 
set tolls and tax rates. These instances highlight a significant research opportunity to 
investigate the CPA of small firms which may not have the resources or capabilities to 
participate in national-level politics.  
Fourth, extant literature measures the impact of political connections on firm performance, 
but does not differentiate between the different types of connections and how they impact 
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performance. For instance, studies about politicians on corporate boards fail to distinguish 
between different types of directors (e.g male vs. female). In the same vein, hardly do studies 
distinguish between “soft money” and “hard money” contributions. Disaggregating these 
strategies into different types is a significant research avenue that could contribute to theory. 
Fifth, surveys are hardly used in CPA empirical studies. In this review, only two studies 
(Peng and Luo, 2000; Lu, 2011) draw on this method. While surveys could be used to obtain 
unique datasets for unique constructs, they could also be used to collect information that is 
hardly public. Having said that, future research could use more of the survey technique in 
ways that allow for the development of novel CPA constructs. 
Sixth, while so many variables of firm performance have been investigated including ROA 
(Boubakri et al., 2012a), ROE (Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010), effective tax rates (Adhikari et al., 
2006), interest income (Carretta et al., 2012), government contracts (Witko, 2011), leverage 
(Fraser et al., 2006) and academic earmarks (De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006) among 
others, there are still avenues for different variables of performance to be examined. Future 
studies could examine how CPA impacts restrictions on pricing or mark ups and import or 
export licensing. Future studies could also examine industry entry restrictions by measuring 
how long it takes to obtain operating licenses. 
Seventh and finally, the controversy around the impact of CPA on risk perception is an 
interesting opportunity for future research. While some studies argue that CPA reduces 
perceived riskiness of the firm (Boubakri et al., 2012b), others argue that it actually increases 
perceived riskiness (Bliss and Gul, 2012). Future research could look deeper into how CPA 
impacts perceived risk and the resultant cost of debt for borrowing firms. One of the sources 
to verify the risk perceptions of politically connectedness is from financial institutions which 
make loans and advances to firms. Hence, another avenue is to investigate how financial 
institutions perceive risk of political connections and how they address this risk in their loan 
decisions. 
7.2 Implications for my PhD  
The future research directions outlined above have implications for my PhD. Combining the 
first, second, fifth and seventh avenues of future research, I plan to answer the following 
overarching research question in my PhD: 
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What is the impact of CPA on perceived firm risk and cost of debt? 
This question will address the Ghanaian context, a virgin region for CPA studies. 
Considering that there are few publicly listed companies and many private companies in 
Ghana, it will be difficult to identify political connections through board compositions due to 
data unavailability. Only public firms publish annual reports. Hence, I intend to collect 
survey data on novel constructs of CPA – 1) whether the firm lobby government or seek to 
influence the passage or content of laws or regulations; and 2) the amount of time senior 
management spend in dealing with government regulation. I also intend to survey or 
interview risk managers of financial institutions on how they perceive the risk inherent in 
politically active firms and how their perceptions of political risk impact their loan decisions. 
This will shed more light on the mechanism through which CPA impacts cost of debt. 
7.3 Academic Contribution and Practical Implications  
There are reviews on the general body of CPA literature (Hillman et al., 2004; Mathur and 
Singh, 2011) but to the best of my knowledge only one (Lawton et al., 2013) was 
systematically conducted. What these studies have done is to summarize insights of the many 
facets of CPA without delving deeper into those facets individually. This review is thus the 
first to distinctively and systematically investigate (Tranfield et al., 2003) the impact of CPA 
on firm performance. It is also the first to do so applying the CIMO-logic (Denyer et al., 
2008). This study provides an overview of research on the topic and reports not only the 
performance implications of CPA but also discusses the contexts and the underlying 
mechanisms of CPA outcomes. Also, two propositions linking contexts, strategies, and 
outcomes are developed. Having identified gaps in extant literature, this review suggests 
significant future research avenues that will improve the current knowledge of CPA outcomes 
and contribute to theory. 
The practical implications of this review are two-fold. First, evidence reveals that CPA adds 
value to firms. This review supports the argument that managerial political capabilities shape 
the competitive environment (McWilliams et al., 2002; Capron and Chatain, 2008) and add 
value to firms (Lawton et al., 2013). Managers should therefore exert effort to develop 
dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) in policy arenas (Lawton et al., 2012) where they 
can influence government regulations in ways that add value to their firms (Getz, 1997; 
Hillman et al., 2004). CPA should not be random or occasional, but should be an integral part 
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of a firm’s strategy where both market and nonmarket elements are coordinated (Baron, 
1999). It needs mentioning that the policy arena dictates the configuration and attractiveness 
of the market environment in every economy. Government regulations affect almost every 
firm (Weidenbaum, 1980), making it imperative for firms to be part of the political process. 
Second, managers ought to be cognizant of the mechanisms through which CPA adds value 
to firms. Deploying political resources and capabilities without understanding the mediators 
of performance would not facilitate the harnessing of maximum benefits. To this end, I would 
entreat managers to ensure that that they build social capital in whatever strategies they 
deploy because it is the dominant mechanism through which firms receive the gains of 
political involvement.  
Figure 7-1 summarizes the contribution of this review. The CIMO logic has revealed gaps for 
future research. It has also shown that CPA adds value to firms, mostly through the 
development of social capital. Hence, managers could engage in CPA and build social capital 
for sustainable competitive advantage. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
This review investigated extant literature to understand the relationship between CPA and 
firm performance. Adopting the CIMO framework (Denyer et al., 2008), this study explored 
the contexts within which CPA has been investigated, the strategies implemented, the 
resultant firm performance outcomes, and the mechanisms underlying the performance 
outcomes (Pilbeam et al., 2012). The findings suggest that CPA has a positive impact on firm 
performance, dominantly through the influence of social capital. There are, however, a few 
studies which reported negative results. Outcomes vary from context to context, an indication 
that institutional differences impact the CPA-firm performance relationship. Similarly, 
institutional contexts influence the strategy that is used by firms or investigated by scholars. 
Consequently, two propositions linking context, strategies, and outcomes were developed. 
Based on thorough analysis, the study discussed implications of the findings and posited 
future research directions. 
8.1 Limitations of the Review   
The limitations of this review are four-fold. First, the findings and arguments made are based 
on 56 articles. Though I employed a rigorous and extensive approach to search for this 
literature, it is far from plausible to claim that all existing and relevant information on CPA 
and firm performance is represented. It is possible that my inclusion and exclusion criteria, 
though reasonable and justified, has caused me to omit studies that could be relevant to the 
research question. Moreover, the small number of studies that I reviewed places limitations 
on the extent of generalization I can make. Hence the findings are tentative; further research 
is required before any strong conclusions can be drawn.  
Second and related to the above limitation is the difficulty to discern causality in the CPA-
firm performance relationship. Regression analysis is the dominant method among the 
reviewed literature. Yet, a common issue with this method is the endogeneity problem. 
Causal ambiguity makes it cumbersome to determine whether well performing firms engage 
in CPA or whether CPA leads to superior firm performance. Therefore, I cannot strongly 
prove at this stage that it is CPA which impacts firm performance. It could be that successful 
firms with slack resources and better capabilities engage in CPA. Consequently, my claim of 
a positive impact of CPA on performance is moderate, tentative and based on extant 
literature. 
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Third, I acknowledge personal bias in the framing of the review question and implementation 
of the quality criteria. Even though the criteria for assessing quality of the selected studies 
were adopted from published work (Huff, 1999), it is my personal judgement that came into 
play when I scored each of the studies on the criteria. In addition, I subjectively decided what 
the cut-off score for inclusion should be and this could have made me exclude or miss 
important pieces of research.  
Fourth and finally, majority of the studies do not clearly or explicitly state the theoretical 
mechanisms through which CPA impacts firm performance. In fact, most of the studies were 
not theoretically grounded. As a result, most of the mechanisms were theoretically implied 
from the arguments made by the authors. I need to mention that my interpretation of those 
arguments into theoretical mechanisms, though carefully done, was subjective. Perhaps, a 
different researcher would have interpreted differently. Despite all the above-mentioned 
limitations, this review was objectively conducted to the best of my ability.  
8.2 Personal Learning 
In this section, I soberly reflect on my learning during the course of undertaking this thesis 
project. First, I want to emphasize that the whole process has been a significant learning 
experience. Having heard and read about systematic reviews, this project afforded me the 
opportunity to get hands-on experience about how they are done. It was challenging, but I am 
appreciative of the fact that I have learned a more reliable and replicable way of probing 
literature. Systematic reviews differ significantly from traditional reviews because of their 
rigidity and objectivity. Nevertheless, I must add that they are not entirely free of researcher 
bias. During the process, I called the shots on some issues such as the inclusion criteria, the 
quality scoring and cut-off point, and even the organization of the themes and the arguments I 
put across. As much as I tried to be objective, personal preferences were at play. Infact, I 
believe that another researcher could have presented the findings in a different shape.  
Importantly, I learned and applied the CIMO-logic which is an insightful way to synthesize 
findings. Going into my scoping review meeting, I had no idea anything like that existed until 
my Panel chair mentioned it. Since then, I have found it useful and interesting. To the best of 
my knowledge, I am the only researcher to apply the CIMO-logic to review literature in the 
CPA field, and this is fulfilling. The CIMO framework has allowed me to make a 
contribution to the literature, and to identify significant avenues for future research. 
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This is the third thesis I have written in my life, but this is the one that required so much time, 
energy, and deep thinking. Examining titles and abstracts of over 2,000 articles, reading full 
texts and extracting relevant information to data forms were time consuming. What was even 
more difficult was synthesizing the information and presenting a coherent and comprehensive 
picture. Through this project, I learned where to look to identify relevant information in an 
article, and how to make meaning of different strands of information. These are skills I look 
to develop further since I will be calling on them throughout my PhD and subsequently in the 
academic/research career I envisage. I sum up with three qualities required to conduct a 
systematic review: discipline, endurance, and craft. 
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10 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 3 3 3 4 4 5 4 3 4 
11 5 3 3 4 4 3 5 3 5 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 4 4 
12 5 5 3 4 3 4 5 5 3 3 5 4 5 4 3 5 3 4 
13 5 5 4 3 3 5 3 3 5 5 4 4 5 3 4 5 3 3 
14 5 4 4 3 4 3 5 4 3 3 5 5 5 3 5 5 3 3 
15 4 4 5 5 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 5 5 3 5 3 
16 5 5 3 3 4 5 3 3 3 4 4 5 4 3 4 4 4 3 
17 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 4 5 5 3 5 5 
18 3 5 5 5 3 5 3 4 5 3 5 3 4 5 4 4 5 3 
19 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 3 5 4 3 3 4 4 4 5 3 3 
20 4 5 4 4 5 4 3 4 3 5 4 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 
21 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 3 
22 3 4 4 3 5 4 3 4 3 4 5 3 5 3 5 5 5 4 
23 5 3 4 4 4 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 3 4 4 4 
24 4 4 4 3 4 5 3 3 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 3 5 4 
25 4 3 5 4 5 5 4 3 3 3 5 4 5 3 5 3 4 3 
26 5 3 5 5 3 3 5 4 3 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 3 3 
27 4 3 5 3 5 5 5 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 5 4 
28 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 5 4 4 5 5 5 3 4 
29 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 3 4 4 4 
30 3 5 4 3 4 3 5 4 5 4 5 3 4 4 3 3 5 4 
31 3 4 4 3 5 4 4 3 5 5 3 3 3 4 4 5 4 4 
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32 3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 3 3 4 4 5 3 
33 5 4 3 3 3 5 3 4 5 3 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 
34 4 5 3 3 5 3 5 3 4 3 3 3 5 4 4 4 5 5 
35 4 3 4 5 5 4 4 3 4 3 4 5 3 4 5 4 4 4 
36 4 5 4 5 4 3 4 4 5 3 3 5 5 4 4 5 3 3 
37 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 5 5 3 3 4 4 3 
38 5 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 4 4 5 3 3 4 5 4 3 
39 4 4 5 3 4 5 5 5 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 5 
40 5 3 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 3 3 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 
41 5 4 4 5 3 4 4 5 3 3 4 3 3 3 5 3 4 5 
42 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 3 3 5 3 5 3 3 4 4 5 4 
43 4 5 3 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 3 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 
44 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 
45 5 3 3 3 3 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 5 4 3 5 4 4 
46 3 5 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 5 
47 4 3 4 3 5 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 4 
48 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 3 5 3 4 4 5 4 4 
49 5 3 5 3 4 4 3 5 3 4 3 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 
50 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 3 5 4 5 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 
51 5 5 3 5 3 4 4 5 4 3 4 3 3 4 5 4 5 5 
52 5 5 5 5 3 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 
53 4 3 3 3 5 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 3 
54 4 4 3 5 5 3 4 5 4 3 5 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 
55 4 4 5 3 4 5 3 3 5 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 3 5 
56 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 3 4 3 3 5 5 3 5 5 
1=Not at all. 2=To a limited extent. 3=At an acceptable level. 4=To a significant level. 5=Completely 
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Appendix D: CIMO Framework for Selected Studies 
  
Adhikari 
et al. 
(2006) 
Aggarwal 
et al. 
(2011) 
Ansolabehere 
et al. (2004) 
Bliss 
and 
Gul 
(2012) 
Boubakri 
et al. 
(2012) 
Boubakri 
et al. 
(2008) 
Boubakri 
et al. 
(2012) 
Brown 
(1996) 
Bunkanwanicha 
and 
Wiwattanakantang 
(2009) 
Carretta 
et al. 
(2012) 
Chaney 
et al. 
(2011) 
Claessens 
et al. 
(2008) 
Cooper 
et al. 
(2010) 
de 
Figueiredo 
and 
Silverman 
(2006) 
Dean et 
al. 
(1998) 
Context                               
Globalization & Competition   X X   X   X     X X   X X X 
Uncertainty & Risk                               
Regulation                   X         X 
Economic transition & Privatization           X                   
Weak institutional environments X     X         X     X       
Political Transition               X               
Management change                               
Strategy/Intervention                               
Financial (PAC/Political 
contributions/Soft money)   X X         X       X X X X 
Relational (Politically connected 
boards/CEOs/Top Management Teams) X     X   X X   X X X     X   
Informational (Petitions/Comments)                               
Mechanism implied by theory                               
Changes in resources and capabilities 
(resourced based view theory)                               
Mis/alignment of business and political 
interests; un/profitable investment; 
managerial self-aggrandizement  
(agency theory)   X X   X X X       X   X X   
Co-optation of external dependencies; 
yielding to dependencies (resource 
dependency theory)         X         X           
Corruption & Cronyism; changes to 
institutional barriers (institutional 
theory) X     X   X           X       
Preferential treatment; influence and 
access to government (social 
capital/network theory) X     X X X   X X     X     X 
Outcomes                               
Stock performance   X X       X X X     X X     
Operating/Accounting performance X     X X X       X X X       
Policy influence                           X X 
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Evans and 
Sherlund 
(2011) 
Faccio 
(2006) 
Faccio et 
al. 
(2006) 
Fan et 
al. 
(2007) 
Fisman 
(2001) 
Francis et 
al. (2009) 
Fraser et 
al. 
(2006) 
Goldman 
et al. 
(2009) 
Hadani 
and 
Schuler 
(2013) 
Hassan et 
al. (2012) 
Hersch et 
al. (2008) 
Hillman 
et al. 
(1999) 
Hillman 
(2005) 
Huber and 
Kirchler 
(2013) 
Imai 
(2006) 
Context                               
Globalization & Competition X X X         X     X X X X   
Uncertainty & Risk   X             X     X X     
Regulation X               X     X X     
Economic transition & Privatization       X X X                   
Weak institutional environments       X   X X     X         X 
Political Transition                               
Management change                               
Strategy/Intervention                               
Financial (PAC/Political contributions/Soft 
money) X               X   X     X   
Relational (Politically connected 
boards/CEOs/Top Management Teams)   X X X   X X X X X   X X   X 
Informational (Petitions/Comments)                               
Mechanism implied by theory                               
Changes in resources and capabilities 
(resourced based view theory)                     X X X     
Mis/alignment of business and political 
interests; un/profitable investment; 
managerial self-aggrandizement  (agency 
theory)   X X X       X X X           
Co-optation of external dependencies; 
yielding to dependencies (resource 
dependency theory)   X             X     X X     
Corruption & Cronyism; changes to 
institutional barriers (institutional theory)   X     X   X               X 
Preferential treatment; influence and access 
to government (social capital/network 
theory) X X X     X X             X X 
Outcomes                               
Stock performance   X   X X X   X X X X X X X   
Operating/Accounting performance     X X     X   X X     X   X 
Policy influence X   X                         
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Jayachandran 
(2006) 
Johnson 
and 
Mitton 
(2003) 
Khwaja 
and 
Mian 
(2005) 
Kim 
(2008) 
Lee 
and 
Baik 
(2010) 
Leuz and 
Oberholzer-
Gee (2006) 
Liebman 
and 
Reynolds 
(2006) 
Lo 
(2003) 
Lu 
(2011) 
Marsh 
(1998) 
Mathur 
and Singh 
(2011) 
McGuire 
et al. 
(1988) 
McKay 
and 
Webb-
Yackee 
(2007) 
Mian et 
al. (2010) 
Niessen 
and 
Ruenzi 
(2010) 
Context                               
Globalization & Competition         X   X   X X X   X   X 
Uncertainty & Risk                               
Regulation   X   X X   X X   X     X X   
Economic transition & Privatization                               
Weak institutional environments   X X     X                   
Political Transition X                             
Management change                       X       
Strategy/Intervention                               
Financial (PAC/Political 
contributions/Soft money) X     X X   X       X     X   
Relational (Politically connected 
boards/CEOs/Top Management Teams)   X X     X           X     X 
Informational (Petitions/Comments)               X   X     X     
Mechanism implied by theory                               
Changes in resources and capabilities 
(resourced based view theory)                       X       
Mis/alignment of business and political 
interests; un/profitable investment; 
managerial self-aggrandizement  (agency 
theory) X     X X     X   X X   X   X 
Co-optation of external dependencies; 
yielding to dependencies (resource 
dependency theory)             X                 
Corruption & Cronyism; changes to 
institutional barriers (institutional theory)   X X     X     X             
Preferential treatment; influence and 
access to government (social 
capital/network theory) X X X   X X           X   X   
Outcomes                               
Stock performance X X   X   X   X   X   X     X 
Operating/Accounting performance     X         X X   X       X 
Policy influence         X   X           X X   
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Peng and Luo 
(2000) 
Richter et al. 
(2009) 
Schuler et al. 
(2002) 
Steagall and 
Jennings 
(1996) 
Sun et al. 
(2011) 
Tu et al. 
(2013) 
Witko 
(2011) 
Wu and 
Cheng 
(2011) 
Wu et al. 
(2012) 
Wu et al. 
(2012) 
Yeh et al. 
(2013) 
Context                       
Globalization & Competition   X X X   X X         
Uncertainty & Risk                       
Regulation   X   X       X       
Economic transition & Privatization X       X X   X   X   
Weak institutional environments           X   X X     
Political Transition                     X 
Management change                       
Strategy/Intervention                       
Financial (PAC/Political contributions/Soft money)   X X X     X         
Relational (Politically connected boards/CEOs/Top 
Management Teams) X       X X   X X X X 
Informational (Petitions/Comments)                       
Mechanism implied by theory                       
Changes in resources and capabilities (resourced based 
view theory) X             X X     
Mis/alignment of business and political interests; 
un/profitable investment; managerial self-
aggrandizement  (agency theory)             X   X X   
Co-optation of external dependencies; yielding to 
dependencies (resource dependency theory) X     X       X       
Corruption & Cronyism; changes to institutional barriers 
(institutional theory)           X           
Preferential treatment; influence and access to 
government (social capital/network theory) X X X   X X X X   X X 
Outcomes                       
Stock performance         X X     X X X 
Operating/Accounting performance X X       X     X X X 
Policy influence     X X     X X       
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Appendix E: Data Extraction Sheets 
Citation/Description 
Title: Corporate Lobbying Revisited 
Author(s): Kim, J. 
Journal: Business & Politics 
Year: 2008 
Keywords: corporate lobbying, campaign contributions, stock returns 
Research objective/Question: More specifically, this paper addresses two main questions: How do the 
determinants of lobbying expenditures differ from those of campaign contributions? How do lobbying 
expenditures pay off in terms of the firm’s financial performance? 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 498 S&P 500 firms between 1998 and 2004  
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Lobbying expenditure data are collected directly from the disclosure 
forms available at the Senate. PAC and soft money contributions data are obtained from the Center for 
Responsive Politics. All the stock and financial data come from CRSP and Compustat 
Methods of analysis: OLS Heckman selection regression 
 
Themess 
Context: Regulation, United States  
Intervention/Strategy: Financial - campaign contributions, lobbying expenditure  
Mechanism implied by theory: Agency theory 
Outcome: Stock return 
 
Results 
Key findings: In terms of equity returns, lobbying firms tend to outperform the market average and, to a lesser 
degree, the average peer in the same industry. Doubling expenditures on lobbying can increase the firm’s equity 
returns by 2.5 percent unadjusted, 2.4 percent relative to the market, and 1.3 percent relative to the industry. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: Measure of endogeneity not appropriate. This suggests that the 
instruments used here may not be perfect and caution must be exercised in using these estimates. 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Increased lobbying is associated with increased firm performance.  
Negative performance:  
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Estimating the Value of Political Connections 
Author(s): Fisman, R. 
Journal: American Economic Review 
Year: 2001 
Keywords: political connections, value, Suharto, Indonesia 
Research objective/Question: To measure the extent to which firms rely on political connections for value 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics:  79 firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Accounting and stock data collected from Financial Times’ Extel 
Financials database  and Investamactic database 
Methods of analysis: Event study  
 
Themes 
Context: Economic transition, Indonesia 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational – connections to Suharto’s government 
Mechanism implied by Theory: Institutional theory 
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Outcome: Stock return 
 
Results 
Key findings: firms with stronger political connections record deeper losses in event windows during which 
there were adverse rumours of Suharto’s health. Consequently, this article suggests that much of a firm’s value 
may be derived from political ties. Politically connected firms on the average, lost more value 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: The sample size is small and limits the extent of generalization 
which the author makes to other corrupt countries. Suharto Dependency Index is a subjective construction by a 
group of consultants and it could be tainted with bias.  
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Firms derive value from political connections 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Corporate political strategies and firm performance: Indications of firm-specific benefits from personal 
service in the US government 
Author(s): Hillman, A. J.; Zardkoohi, A.; Bierman, L. 
Journal: Strategic Management Journal 
Year: 1999 
Keywords: political strategies; financial performance; event studies; government linkages 
Research objective/Question: This study measures the change in firm value as a result of a linkage with the 
government 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 31 Presidential cabinet-level appointees and elected members of 
congress between 1968 and 1992 who were either board members or part of senior management teams of public 
companies listed 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Used Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post 
newspapers to check for political appointments. Stock price information obtained from either the Wall Street 
Journal or on the CRSP data tape. 
Methods of analysis: Event study 
 
Themes 
Context: Regulation, Uncertainty, Competition, United States 
Intervention/ Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: Resource dependency, RBV 
Outcome: Stock return 
 
Results 
Key findings: Firms that are able to gain access to the political process may benefit from a reduction in 
uncertainty, reduced transaction costs, and increased survival. The firms in the sample experienced a significant 
overall average abnormal return of 1.60 percent, with specific firms experiencing abnormal returns as high as a 
positive 13.7 percent increase 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: Small sample size. Future studies should investigate what 
underlies the value generation of political connections. 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Evidence suggests that a linkage with the government is positively related to firm value in 
our sample 
Negative performance:  
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
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Citation/Description 
Title: In search of El Dorado: The elusive financial returns on corporate political investments 
Author(s): Hadani, M; Schuler, D. A. 
Journal: Strategic Management Journal 
Year: 2013  
Keywords: corporate political activity, regulation, agency theory, political service, financial performance 
Research objective/Question: What is the relationship between CPA and firm financial performance? 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 943 large and mid-cap firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: S&P 1500 database from 1998-2008. Political investment data sources 
include the Web sites of the Center for Responsive Politics (2011), Federal Election Commission, and the 
Senate’s Office of Public Records, and reflect federal-level data. 
Methods of analysis: Regression analysis.  
 
Themes 
Context: Uncertainty, Regulation, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial and Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: Agency theory 
Type of outcome: Stock and operating performance – market value and ROS 
 
Results 
Key findings: CPI is negatively associated with market value. CCPI are negatively associated with market value. 
Board political service is negatively associated with market value 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: Not enough data.  Future studies aimed at looking into the 
impact of state- versus federal-level CPA may be warranted, taking into account the significant variance in state-
level disclosure laws. 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance:  
Negative performance: The largely unexpected results, in particular the negative relationship between all three 
measures of CPA and a firm’s market value, merit specific attention. CPA may represent poor quality 
investment. 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Politically connected firms 
Author(s): Faccio, M 
Journal: American Economic Review 
Year: 2006 
Keywords: political connections, firm value, Management, shareholders, corruption 
Research objective/Question: What common characteristics do countries with widespread political connections 
share? And, do connections add to company value? 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 157 publicly traded firms. 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Chiefs of State directory, Worldscope database, Lexis-Nexis, The 
Financial Times, The Economist 
Methods of analysis: Event study 
 
Themes 
Context: Competition, risk, Multiple countries 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational – shareholders or Top Management politically connected 
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Mechanism implied by theory: resource dependency theory, agency theory, corruption 
Type of outcome: Stock performance 
 
 
Results 
Key findings: The results for the whole sample indicate that the announcement of a new connection results in an 
abnormal return of 1.43 percent. Connections with more powerful politicians and with businesspeople with 
more vested interests in the company result in larger announcement returns 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Political connections generate value 
Negative performance:  
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Public policy, political connections, and effective tax rates: Longitudinal evidence from Malaysia 
Author(s): Adhikari, A.; Derashid, C.; Zhang, H. 
Journal: Journal of Accounting & Public Policy 
Year: 2006 
Keywords: Political connections; Public policy; Effective tax rates; Relationship-based economies 
Research objective/Question: This paper contributes to the currently scarce ETR literature on non-western firms 
by exploring the link between political connections and ETR in Malaysia 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 257 firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Annual reports of firms listed on Kuala Lumpur stock exchage 
Methods of analysis: Regression analysis 
 
Themes 
Context: Emerging economies, Malaysia 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational – informal ties 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital, institutional theory 
Outcome: Operating performance – effective tax rates 
 
Industry of focus: Multiple 
 
Results 
Key findings: Politically connected firms have significantly lower ETR than unconnected firms irrespective of 
how ETR or political connection is defined. We find that firms with political connections pay tax at significantly 
lower effective rates in Malaysia. The results suggest that political connections are an important determinant of 
ETR in ‘‘relationship-based’’ economies. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: A major limitation, which is common to all ETR studies, is that 
mechanisms or processes, which are actually responsible for certain firms to pay tax at lower effective rates than 
other firms, are not examined. Future studies would be to investigate the specific mechanisms by which a lower 
ETR may be achieved.  
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: There is a statistically significant negative link between ETR and political connections. 
Firms with political connections pay tax at significantly lower effective rates in Malaysia 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
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Citation/Description 
Title: Political connection and cost of debt: Some Malaysian evidence 
Author(s): Bliss, M. A.; Gul, F. A. 
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance 
Year: 2012 
Keywords: Political connection, Cost of debt, CEO duality, Audit committees 
Research objective/Question: The objective of this study is to extend our understanding of these firms by 
investigating (1) whether these firms have a higher cost of debt capital given their association with higher 
leverage, and (2) whether major corporate governance reforms instituted by the Malaysian government have had 
any effect on the cost of debt to these firms. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics:  
The sample consists of the Malaysian top 500 non-finance public listed companies in terms of market 
capitalization for years 2001–2004. 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Annual reports and previous studies (Faccio, 2006) 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Emerging economies, Malaysia 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: Institutional theory 
Outcome: Operating performance – cost of debt 
 
Results 
Key findings: Politically connected firms are associated with higher interest rates on debt. This result indicates 
that lenders perceive PCON firms to be riskier and, as such, compensate themselves by charging these firms 
higher rates of interest on their borrowings. The results from this study find a positive association between 
interest rates charged by lenders and PCON firms. This result suggests that lenders perceive these firms as being 
riskier than non-PCON firms 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: This study only covers four years of Malaysian data and hence 
an external validity problem exists in that the results may not be transportable over different time periods and 
locations. Second, PCON firms are identified only if they are identified as such in either Johnson and Mitton 
(2003) or Faccio (2006). Whilst this is an objective criterion, it is possible that other PCON firms are present in 
the sample and remain unidentified, and that some PCON firms may be more politically connected than others. 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: “The results from this study provide evidence that the interest rates charged by lenders to 
PCON firms are significantly higher than those charged to non-PCON firms. This is in line with our expectation 
that lenders perceive PCON firms to be more risky.” (p.1521) 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: The Impact of Political Connections on Firms' Operating Performance and Financing Decisions 
Author(s): Boubakri, N.; Cosset, J.; Saffar, W. 
Journal: Journal of Financial Research 
Year: 2012 
Keywords: political connections, debt financing, performance 
Research objective/Question: This study re-examines the consequences of political connections in a new 
framework, by conducting a worldwide event study to analyze how the political connections of publicly traded 
firms affect their accounting performance and financing decisions 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 234 firms from 23 countries 
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Data sources/ Data collection methods: Multiples sources and studies, Worldscope, 
Extel, company websites, and LexisNexis 
Methods of analysis: Regression analysis, event study 
 
Themes 
Context/Geography: competition, Multiple countries 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: agency theory, resource dependency, social capital 
Outcome: Operating performance - ROA 
 
Results 
Key findings: politically connected firms outperform their non-connected counterparts after the establishment of 
the connections. They also have high leverage ratio and increased debt maturities. Connected firms have easier 
access to debt. The performance is higher with stronger ties 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research:  
 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Politically connected firms improve their performance and increase their debt level after 
the establishment of political connections. 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Political connections of newly privatized firms 
Author(s): Boubakri, N.; Cosset, J.; Saffar, W. 
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance 
Year: 2008 
Keywords: Privatization, political connection, performance 
Research objective/Question: To examine the extent of political connections in privatised firms and impact of 
political connections on operating performance 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 245 privatized firms between 1980 and 2002 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: list of privatized firms World Bank privatization database and 
Privatization barometer. Worldscope, Disclosure, Bankscope  
Methods of analysis: Regressions 
 
Themes 
Context: Globalization, competition, Multiple countries 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: Institutional theory, Agency theory 
Outcome: Operating performance – ROA, ROE, Sales 
 
Results 
Key findings: Politically connected NPFs perform poorly when compared with their counterparts. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: Politically-connected firms exhibit a poor accounting performance compared to their 
non-connected counterparts. 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
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Citation/Description 
Title: Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions 
Author(s): Claessens, S.; Feijen, E.; Laeven, L. 
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics 
Year: 2008 
Keywords: Campaign contributions; Elections; Corruption; Preferential lending 
Research objective/Question: Do higher campaign contributions imply more future firm-specific political 
favours? And, if so, what are these political favours? 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 238 firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: The data for both the 1998 and 2002 elections are collected by the 
Brazilian national election court, the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). 
Methods of analysis: Event study, Regression analysis 
 
Themes 
Context: Emerging economy, Brazil 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial – campaign contributions 
Mechanism implied by theory: Institutional theory, social capital 
Outcome: Stock and Operating performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: There is evidence that higher campaign contributions to federal deputy candidates are associated 
with higher stock returns around the announcement of the election results. Contributing to deputy candidates 
that win the election has an even larger positive impact on stock returns…we find that the bank leverage of 
firms that made contributions to (elected) federal deputies increased substantially during the four years 
following the election. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research:  
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Increased access to financing and stock price appreciation 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value? 
Author(s): Goldman, E.; Rocholl, J.; So, J. 
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies 
Year: 2009 
Keywords: political connections, corporate boards, firm value 
Research objective/Question: To investigate whether politically connected boards add value to publicly traded 
firms. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 349 politically connections of S&P 500 firms,  
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Compustat data for the 
sample companies as well as CRSP data, Centre for Responsive Politics 
Methods of analysis: Event study 
Theoretical background: 
 
Themes 
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Context: Competition, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational  
Mechanism implied by theory: Agency theory 
Outcome: Stock performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: Following the announcement of the board nomination of a politically connected individual, there 
is on average a positive and significant stock-price response. The announcement returns are positive for the 
Republican portfolio and negative for the Democratic portfolio. Connections are more valuable when current 
administration and politician belong to same party. Returns are higher in highly regulated industries than in non-
regulated industries. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: It will be interesting to explore the specific actions that create 
this value and their legal and political ramifications. 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: There is a positive abnormal return following the nomination of a politically connected 
board member 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Politicians on the Board of Directors: Do Connections Affect the Bottom Line? 
Author(s): Hillman, A. 
Journal: Journal of Management 
Year: 2005 
Keywords: boards of directors; politicians; board composition 
Research objective/Question: Do politicians on boards add value to a firm?  
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 300 firms, 150 from each group of heavily regulated and lowly 
regulated industries 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Random sampling 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Globalization and competition, uncertainty, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: Resource dependency, RBV 
Outcome: Stock and Operating performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: the number of politicians on a corporate board is positively and significantly related to market 
capitalization and Tobin Q. Though the relationship is positive for ROS and ROA, it is insignificant. Firms in 
heavily regulated industries perform better. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: The study is cross-sectional, which limits the ability to discern 
causality. Another important limitation of this study is its U.S-centric view. The relationship between business 
and government and, specifically, politicians on the board of directors and firm performance is likely to be 
different in other institutional contexts. Future research could explore other types of directors (e.g., gender and 
ethnically diverse boards, representatives of important stakeholders, etc.), how environment/board alignment is 
achieved, and its subsequent effect on performance. 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Politically connected firms are associated with better performance 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
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Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Creating barriers for foreign competitors: A study of the impact of anti-dumping actions on the 
performance of US firms 
Author(s): Marsh, S. 
Journal: Strategic Management Journal 
Year: 1998 
Keywords: foreign competition; political strategy; trade protection 
Research objective/Question: This study investigates whether anti-dumping statutes are effective at improving 
the performance of U.S. firms 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 134 filings by 88 publicly traded firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: petitioners were identified through the USITC Annual Reports for fiscal 
years 1980 through 1992.  
Methods of analysis: Event study 
 
Themes 
Context/Geography: Globalization, competition, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Informational 
Mechanism implied by theory: Agency theory 
Outcome: Stock performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: The results show that for the initial filing of an anti-dumping petition, the average abnormal return 
was 0.01, or 1 percent, which is statistically significant…The analysis suggests that an initial filing event results 
in an average increase of $45.9 million in market capitalization for petitioning firms. Firms benefit from anti-
dumping petitions 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: More research is needed to understand what types of activity 
improve performance and how political activity complements other strategic decisions and actions a firm makes. 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: This analysis suggests that the market anticipates that anti-dumping petitions will create 
increased cash flow, and as a result, the market price of the securities increases 1 percent beyond the expected 
normal market price.” 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Big Business Owners in Politics 
Author(s): Bunkanwanicha, P.; Wiwattanakantang, Y. 
Journal: Review of Financial Studies 
Year: 2009 
Keywords: politics, business, contracts, Thailand 
Research objective/Question: This paper provides new empirical evidence on the economic incentives enticing 
big business owners to seek election to top public office and the economic outcomes of holding office 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 2000 listed and non-listed firms  
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Financial information obtained from Worldscope and DataStream. The 
ownership information is obtained from two databases, namely, the I-SIM CDROM and the SETSMART online 
service produced by the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET).  
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Business On Line (BOL) database provides the accounting and ownership information of non-listed companies. 
Electoral Commission of Thailand 
Methods of analysis: Event Study -  
 
Themes 
Context: Emerging economies, Thailand 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational – business owners entering politics 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital, Private-interest theory 
Outcome: Stock performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: Big owners increase the value of their companies when they go into politics. There is a positive 
relationship between business tycoons holding concession contracts and their decision to run for public office.  
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: Further studies could investigate the outcomes of tycoons 
holding top offices, in particular, whether they would leave the country better or worse off 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: After the tycoons took office, their firms achieved greater market valuation than other 
firms. 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Ownership and the Value of Political Connections: Evidence from China 
Author(s): Wu, W.; Wu, C.; Rui, O. M. 
Journal: European Financial Management 
Year: 2012 
Keywords: political connection, ownership, firm value, corporate governance, China 
Research objective/Question: To investigate the impact of political ties conditional on ownership for a sample of 
Chinese firms over the period 1999–2006. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 1,331 firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: China Stock Market and Accounting (CSMAR) database 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Emerging economy, China 
Type of political strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: Agency theory, RBV 
Outcome: Stock and Operating performance – Tobin Q and ROA 
 
Results 
Key findings: Private firms with politically connected managers have a higher value than those lacking such 
managers, whereas local SOEs (SOEs with local, rather than central, government as the ultimate owner) with 
politically connected managers have a lower value and poorer performance than those without such managers. 
Private firms with politically connected managers obtain more government subsidies than those lacking such 
managers, whereas local SOEs with politically connected managers employ more surplus labour than those 
without such managers.  Private firms with politically connected managers are able to obtain more government 
subsidies than those without connected managers 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: politically connected managers have a higher value than those without connected 
managers 
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Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially 
privatized firms 
Author(s): Fan, J. P. H.; Wong, T. J.; Zhang, T. 
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics 
Year: 2007 
Keywords: Political connections; Corporate governance; IPO performance; Partial privatization; China 
Research objective/Question: To investigate the impact of political connections on post-IPO performance 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 790 newly listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 1993 to 2001 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: IPO-year ownership data from the Shenzhen Genius Information 
Technology Company database; stock return and financial data from the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database; and China’s regional economic data from China Economic Information Network 
Data Co., Ltd. 
Methods of analysis: Event study  
 
Themes 
Context/Geography: Emerging economy, economic transition, China 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: Agency theory 
Outcome: Stock and operating performance – CARs, sales, ROS 
 
Results 
Key findings: “The mean CAR of the group of firms run by politically connected CEOs exhibits a steep decline 
of 30% over the three years subsequent to the IPOs, while the mean CAR of the second group of firms exhibits a 
much smaller drop of 12% over the same period.” (p. 336-337) Firms with politically connected CEOs 
underperform those without politically connected CEOs by 7% one year after the IPO, 10% two years after the 
IPO, and 15% three years after the IPO. Politically connected CEOs experience deteriorating accounting 
performance subsequent to their IPOs, regardless of whether performance is measured by sales growth, earnings 
growth, or the change in ROS. Firms with politically connected CEOs are more likely to have boards populated 
by current or former government bureaucrats. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: long-term post-IPO stock returns are significantly worse when a firm’s CEO is 
politically connected. The accounting performance of a firm run by a politically connected CEO is also 
consistently worse than that of an otherwise similar firm. 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Academic earmarks and returns to lobbying 
Author(s): de Figueiredo, J. M.; Silverman, B. S. 
Journal: Journal of Law and Economics 
Year: 2006 
Keywords: lobbying, earmarks, universities,  
Research objective/Question: To estimate the elasticities of lobbying with respect to academic earmarks (grants) 
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Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Academic earmarks data obtained from Center for Responsive Politics 
and Chronicle for Higher Education. 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Competition, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational and Financial – representation and lobbying expenditure 
Mechanism implied by theory: Agency theory 
Outcome: Policy – education earmarks 
 
Results 
Key findings: There is a 1% increase in lobbying expenditures by a university without representation on the 
House Appropriations Committee (HAC) or Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) results in a 0.17% 
increase in earmarks….if the university is represented by a member of the HAC or SAC, then this 1% increase 
in lobbying yields an additional 0.28% or 0.35% increase in earmarks, respectively. Universities with 
representation lobby less. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research:  
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance:  
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: “Our main result is that universities that are represented by HAC or SAC members 
earn higher returns on their lobbying efforts than unrepresented universities” 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts 
Author(s): Faccio, M.; Masulis, R.W.; McConnell, J.J 
Journal: Journal of Finance 
Year: 2006 
Keywords: political connections, bailouts, debt financing, performance 
Research objective/Question: This study undertakes a systematic examination of the link between political 
connections and corporate bailouts. Do political connections lead to preferential corporate bailouts? Are bailouts 
of politically connected firms more likely in countries that receive International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World 
Bank (WB) rescue packages? Is the financial performance of politically connected bailed-out firms different 
from that of nonconnected bailed-out firms? 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 450 firms from 35 countries between 1997-2002 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Data obtained Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign 
Governments (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1997) and the official web site of each country’s government 
and/or parliament. Worldscope, Extel, the company’s web sites, or Lexis-Nexis, Factiva 
Methods of analysis: Regressions 
 
Themes 
Context: Regulation, competition, Multiple countries 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital, Agency theory 
Outcome: Policy and operating performance – bailout and ROA 
 
Results 
Key findings: “politically connected (but publicly traded) firms are more likely to be bailed out than are their 
nonconnected peers…politically connected exhibit significantly poorer operating performance (ROA) than their 
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nonconnected peers at the time of the bailout and over the following 2 years… connected firms make greater use 
of debt financing than do their nonconnected peers.”  (p. 2598). Lenders lend to connected firms either because 
of bailout out guarantee or coercion by government or benefits for making such loans.  
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance:  
Negative performance: Bailed-out connected firms have significantly lower ROAs than their industry peers and 
lower industry-adjusted ROAs than other bailed-out, but nonconnected, firms in the year of and in the 2 years 
following their bailouts 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: Political connections apparently increase the likelihood of a government bailout of a 
troubled firm. 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia 
Author(s): Johnson, S.; Mitton, T.; 
Journal: Journal of Accounting and Economics 
Year: 2003 
Keywords: Capital controls; Political connections; Financial crises; Institutions 
Research objective/Question: To investigate the value of political connections in Malaysia 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 434 Malaysian firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Worldscope 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Emerging economy, Malaysia 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: institutional theory, social capital 
Outcome: Stock performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: Politically connected firms suffered more during the crisis but re-bounded more after capital 
controls were imposed. The performance is better with more powerful politicians.  
Practical implications: 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: Using the analysis of Gomez and Jomo (1997) to identify 
connections has two limitations. First, these authors do not claim to have exhaustively identified every firm with 
political connections in Malaysia. Second, overtime some of these connections could have disappeared.  
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: political connections affect firm value positively 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Political connections and the process of going public: Evidence from China 
Author(s): Francis, B. B.; Hasan, I.; Sun, X. 
Journal: Journal of International Money & Finance 
Year: 2009 
Keywords: Political connections, IPO, emerging markets 
Research objective/Question: This article examines how political connections impact the process of going 
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public. Specifically, it tests how political connections impact the pricing of the newly offered shares, the 
magnitude of under-pricing, and the fixed cost of going public. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 423 domestic IPOs during 1994–1999 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: The list of companies going public is obtained from the New Issues of 
the Security Data Corporation (SDC). 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Economic transition, emerging economies, China 
Type of political strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital 
Type of outcome: Stock performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: “To be specific, if the issuing firms (i) have board members who in the past- or are currently 
working for the government at least at a level equal or higher than a city mayor; (ii) use bookrunners that 
participated actively in the largest state-owned IPOs; (iii) have majority of shares controlled by the central 
government or other SOEs; or (iv) have any combination of the three, they are more likely to receive a higher 
than the median P/E ratio (a multiplier to determine the offering price) from the government” (p. 698). Cost of 
going public is lower for politically connected firms. Also, there is a negative relationship between political 
connectedness and the degree of under-pricing.  
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: The results show that there is a positive and statistically significant probability of getting 
a higher than the median P/E ratio if firms are politically connected to either through board members or 
bookrunners 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Political connections, tax benefits and firm performance: Evidence from China 
Author(s):  Wu, W.; Wu, C.; Zhou, C.; Wu, J. 
Journal: Journal of Accounting & Public Policy 
Year: 2012 
Keywords: political connections, private firms, SOEs, tax rate 
Research objective/Question: This paper investigates the different effects of political connections on the firm 
performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 1408 firms sampled between 1999-2007 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: China Stock Market and Accounting database (CSMAR). 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Economic transition, China 
Type of political strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: Agency theory, social capital 
Outcome: Stock and operating performance – ROA, Tobin Q, effective tax rate 
 
Results 
Key findings: The effective tax rates (ETRs) of private firms with connected managers are lower than that of 
private firms without such managers. Private firms with politically connected managers have higher valuation 
100 | P a g e  
 
than those without connected managers. Politically connected firms have higher ROAs than non-connected 
firms.  
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: private firms with politically connected managers outperform those without connected 
managers 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: The impact of managerial political connections and quality on government subsidies 
Author(s): Wu, J.; Cheng, M. L.  
Journal: Chinese Management Journal 
Year: 2011 
Keywords: Managerial political connections, Government subsidy, Managerial reputation, Company 
performance, China, Politics, Subsidies, Managers, Public companies 
Research objective/Question: This study extends previous literature on political connections by examining the 
impact of managerial political connections on obtaining one specific external resource – government subsidies – 
in an emerging market 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 212 Chinese firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: SINOFIN database constructed by the China Center for Economic 
Research at Peking University. China Securities Regulatory Commission 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Economic transition, emerging economies, regulation, China 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: Resource dependency, social capital 
Outcome: Policy - subsidies 
 
Results 
Key findings: positive relationship between managerial political connections and government subsidies.  
Managerial reputation and firm past performance will influence government officials’ judgment in allocating 
resources to firms with political ties. When past performance is high, managerial political connections have a 
very significant and positive impact on government subsidies. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: Future research can design face-to-face interviews and directly 
measure corporate political connections. This study focuses only on one formal political tie – managerial work 
experience in government. Future research can explore the effect of other types of political connections, alone or 
in conjunction, on obtaining government subsidies. Third, while this study only considers the quantity of 
political connections, future work can explore the quality of such connections.  Finally, the study examined the 
role of managerial political connections within a specific context (i.e. China), and future studies can explore this 
issue in other emerging markets and verify the generalizability of our findings. 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance:  
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: Political connections are related to higher subsidies 
Policy Influence failure: 
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Citation/Description 
Title: Corporate campaign contributions and abnormal stock returns after presidential elections 
Author(s): Huber, J.; Kirchler, M. 
Journal: Public Choice 
Year: 2013 
Keywords: Presidential election · Corporate campaign contributions · Abnormal returns 
Research objective/Question: To explore whether the total contributions of a company and the distribution of 
contributions to the winner and loser of an election were correlated with abnormal returns to its stocks 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 400 firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Centre for Responsive Politics, DataStream 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Competition, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial - contributions 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital 
Outcome: Stock performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: The log of total contributions given to the winner in a presidential election and (ii) the log of a 
company’s total contribution (divided by market capitalization) were both positively and significantly related to 
its stock market performance in the two years after an election 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Companies experienced abnormal positive post-election returns with (i) a higher 
percentage of contributions given to the eventual winner 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Capital structure and political patronage: The case of Malaysia 
Author(s): Fraser, D. R.; Zhang, H.; Derashid, C. 
Journal: Journal of Banking and Finance 
Year: 2006 
Keywords: Capital structure; Political patronage; Malaysia 
Research objective/Question: To examine the linkage between leverage and political connections 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 257 firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Sample is hand-gathered from 1990 to 1999 annual reports published by 
firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). 
Methods of analysis: Regressions 
 
Themes 
Context: Emerging economy, Malaysia 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital 
Outcome: Operating performance - leverage 
 
Results 
102 | P a g e  
 
Key findings: Politically connected firms carry more debt than nonconnected firms. These connected firms have 
preferential access to financing. Political connections influence capital structure 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: These results suggest that political patronage is linked to a firm’s ability to carry more 
debt 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Economic consequences of regulated changes in disclosure: the case of executive compensation 
Author(s): Lo, K 
Journal: Journal of Accounting and Economics 
Year: 2003 
Keywords: Corporate governance; Disclosure; Executive compensation; Securities regulation 
Research objective/Question: This paper used several complementary approaches to assess the impact of the 
SEC’s regulation of executive compensation disclosure 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 195 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: US SEC archives, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Methods of analysis: Event study,  
 
Themes 
Context: Regulation, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: informational – lobbying with information 
Mechanism implied by theory: agency theory 
Outcome: Stock and operating performance – ROA, ROE, CARs 
 
Results 
Key findings: Companies that lobbied against the regulation had, relative to control firms: (i) return-on assets 
and return-on-equity that improved by 0.5% and 3%, respectively; and (ii) excess stock returns of 6% over the 
8-month period between the announcement and the adoption of the proposed regulation. Also, firms lobbying 
more vigorously against the proposal had more positive abnormal stock returns during events that increased the 
probability of regulation. ROA and ROE of firms that lobbied against the regulation improved in years after the 
regulation was passed.  
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: Other disclosure regulations such as those concerning 
segmented reporting and the use of derivatives could provide fruitful research opportunities. 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Lobbying firms improved their performance 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms 
Author(s): Chaney, P. K.; Faccio, M.; Parsley, D. 
Journal: Journal of Accounting and Economics 
Year: 2011 
Keywords: Quality of information, Accruals quality, Political ties 
Research objective/Question: This paper investigates whether earnings quality varies systematically with 
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political connections in a wide sample of countries and politically connected firms. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 4954 firms from 19 countries 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Worldscope, Lexis-Nexis, Extel, Chiefs of State (CIA) 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Competition, Multiple countries 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: agency theory 
Outcome: Operating performance  - accruals quality 
 
Results 
Key findings: The quality of reported accounting information is systematically poorer for firms with political 
connections than for firms lacking such connections. The quality of accruals has no significant impact on a 
firm’s likelihood of establishing a connection i.e. the quality of prior accruals does not explain a firm’s 
propensity to establish a connection in a given period.  
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: The presence of political connections is associated with a lower quality of accounting 
earnings 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Political relationships, global financing, and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia 
Author(s): Leuz, C.; Oberholzer-Gee, F. 
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics 
Year: 2006 
Keywords: political connections, financing, debt, equity, performance, Indonesia 
Research objective/Question: This study examines the role of political connections in firms’ financing strategies 
and their long run performance. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 130 Indonesian firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Worldscope, Datastream, Bloomberg, Global Access, and SDC as well 
as the SEC filings on Edgar, lists of foreign listings from major international stock exchanges, and the ADR lists 
provided by the Bank of New York and Citibank. 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Emerging economies, globalization, Indonesia 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital, institutional theory 
Outcome: Stock performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: Results show that well-connected firms are less likely to have publicly traded debt or equity 
securities abroad, suggesting that connections and global financing are substitutes. Well-connected firms have 
access to preferential financing at home and therefore do not need to access foreign capital markets. Closely 
connected firms underperformed during the Asian financial crisis as long as Suharto was in power, recovered 
under Suharto’s long-time ally Habibie, but significantly underperformed under Wahid, a cleric critical of the 
Suharto regime. 
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Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Political connections add value to firms 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Political patronage and firm performance: Further evidence from Malaysia 
Author(s): Hassan,T.; Hassan, M. K.; Mohamad, S.; Min, C. C. 
Journal: Thunderbird International Business Review 
Year: 2012 
Keywords: political connections, Malaysia, operating performance 
Research objective/Question: This paper investigates the characteristics, performance, and share price reaction 
of politically connected firms versus a control sample of independent firms in Malaysia 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 82 Malaysian firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Annual reports,  
Methods of analysis: Event study, regression 
Theoretical background:  
 
Themes 
Context: emerging economy, Malaysia 
Type of political strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: Agency theory 
Outcome: Stock and operating – ROA and CARs 
 
Results 
Key findings: Politically connected firms had higher level of leverage, lower profitability, and lower sales to 
profitability, and paid lower taxes and lower dividends compared to independent firms. Their share prices 
increase with the announcement of favourable political events. In terms of performance, the active rent-seeking 
activities in return for preferential treatment produce comparable performance to independent firms during an 
economic upturn. However, their performance deteriorates more than independent firms during an economic 
downturn. Politically connected firms have easier access to debt financing 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Share price increase with announcement of political connections 
Negative performance: Operating performance negative 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Political connections and the cost of equity capital 
Author(s): Boubakri, N.; Guedhami, O.; Mishra, D.; Saffar, W. 
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance 
Year: 2012 
Keywords: political connections, cost of equity, risk 
Research objective/Question: This paper examines the cost of equity capital of politically connected firms 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 1248 firm year observations from 26 countries 
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Data sources/ Data collection methods: Worldscope, Faccio (2006) 
Methods of analysis: Regressions 
 
Themes 
Context: Multiple countries 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: agency theory 
Outcome: Stock performance – cost of equity 
 
Results 
Key findings: Politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their nonconnected peers. 
Political connections are more valuable for firms with stronger ties to political power. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research:  
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, which suggest 
that politically connected firms are generally considered less risky than non-connected firms. 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market 
Author(s): Khwaja, A. I.; Mian, A. 
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics 
Year: 2005 
Keywords: Political connections, lenders, preferential lending, default rate 
Research objective/Question: To investigate the impact of political connections and rents on lending 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 93,316 firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Credit Information Bureau (CIB) database at the State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP) 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Emerging economies, Pakistan 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital, institutional theory 
Outcome: Operating performance - lending 
 
Results 
Key findings: Political firms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates. Such preferential 
treatment occurs exclusively in government banks—private banks provide no political favours. Political rents 
increase with the strength of the firm’s politician and whether he or his party is in power.  
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: How the nature and extent of rents affect the political and 
institutional environment presents another interesting direction of future enquiry. 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Politically connected firms receive substantial preferential treatment. Not only do such 
firms receive 45 percent larger loans, but they also have 50 percent higher default rates on these loans 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
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Citation/Description 
Title: Lobbying and Taxes 
Author(s): Richter, B. K.; Samphantharak, K.; Timmons, J. F. 
Journal: American Journal of Political Science 
Year: 2009 
Keywords: lobbying, tax, benefits 
Research objective/Question: This paper investigates the tax benefits obtained from lobbying. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 3,952 firm-year observations 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Lobbying expenditure from Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) with 
financial accounting data on all active firms in the COMPUSTAT database 
Methods of analysis: Regressions 
 
Themes 
Context: Competition, regulation, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial – lobbying expenditure 
Mechanism implied by theory: 
Outcome: Operating performance – effective tax rate 
 
Results 
Key findings: Firms that spend more on lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year. 
Increasing registered lobbying expenditures by 1% appears to lower effective tax rates by somewhere in the 
range of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points for the average firm that lobbies. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: On the average firms with higher lobbying expenditures in one year pay lower effective 
tax rates in the following year 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Campaign Contributions, Access, and Government Contracting 
Author(s): Witko, C. 
Journal: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
Year: 2011 
Keywords: political donations, government contracts, corporate governance, firm reputation 
Research objective/Question: This paper discusses how campaign contributions may influence contracting and 
considers the relationship between the donation of campaign contributions and the receipt of government 
contracts for a sample of firms politically active between 1979 and 2006. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 4771 observations 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Federal Procurement Data System, Lexis-Nexis 
Methods of analysis: Regression analysis 
 
Themes 
Context: Competition, regulation, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial – campaign contributions 
Mechanism implied by theory: Agency theory, social capital 
Outcome: Policy – government contracts 
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Results 
Key findings: The analysis shows that even after controlling for past contracts and other factors, companies that 
contributed more money to federal candidates subsequently received more contracts. Firms with more contracts 
and more campaign contributions last period receive more contracts and companies with a poorer reputation 
receive fewer contracts. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: Firms with more contracts and more campaign contributions in the last period receive 
more contracts 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: The value of local political capital in transition China 
Author(s): Sun, P.; Xu, H.; Zhou, J. 
Journal: Economic Letters 
Year:2011 
Keywords: Political connections, Political capital, Transition, China 
Research objective/Question: This paper documents stock market responses to the arrest of Shanghai's top 
leader by the Chinese central government in September 2006. It investigates the performance of firms with 
political connections to the Shanghai-based political network. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 137 firms listed on shanghai stock exchange 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Shanghai stock exchange,  
Methods of analysis: Event study 
 
Themes 
Context: Economic transition, emerging economies, China 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital 
Outcome: Stock performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: The paper finds the significant value of personal-level political capital for Shanghai-based 
publicly traded companies. Event study results show that organizational ties to the local state per se were not 
valued by investors, but they were able to add value in combination with personal political connections: Firms 
that had both ownership and personal ties to the municipal government suffered the most negative CARs upon 
the damage of the local political network. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Firms derive value from political connections 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China 
Author(s): Tu, G.; Lin, B.; Liu, F. 
Journal: Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 
Year: 2013 
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Keywords: Privatization, China, political connections, acquisitions, premium 
Research objective/Question: This paper examines how the political connections of acquirers influence the 
process and outcomes of privatization in China. It explores, in the Chinese context, how these connections affect 
the choice of privatization targets and target firm performance following privatization. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 210 firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Annual reports, newswires 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: emerging economy, economic transition, competition, China 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital, institutional theory 
Outcome: Stock and Operating performance – BHARs, ROA 
 
Results 
Key findings: PCAs buy more profitable firms and engage in more tunnelling activities. Bribery and Political 
activity are negatively associated with ROA and BHAR, which indicates that relative performance deteriorates 
among firms that are acquired by PCAs. PCAs gain control of better performing target firms without paying a 
higher premium relative to their counterparts without political connections 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: PCAs are more likely to obtain higher quality deals. Politically connected acquirers 
receive preferential treatment and acquire higher quality firms during full privatization 
Negative performance: Firms acquired by PCAs have lower ROA and BHAR than firms acquired by non-PCAs.  
No impact: 
Policy Influence success:  
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Political connections and trade expansion 
Author(s): Lu, Y. 
Journal: Economics of Transition 
Year: 2011 
Keywords: Political connections, trade expansion, economic institutions, Chinese People’s Congress 
Research objective/Question: This article, using a 2004 survey of Chinese private firms, empirically studies the 
impact of political connections (indicated by being a deputy to the Chinese People’s Congress) on trade 
expansion 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 1,603 observations 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Survey of China’s Private Enterprises conducted in 2004. The Survey 
was conducted jointly by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China, the All China Industry and Commerce Federation, and the China Society of Private Economy at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
Theoretical background: 
 
Themes 
Context: economic transition, competition, globalization, China 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: Institutional theory  
Outcome: Operating performance – sales and trade expansion 
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Results 
Key findings: Regression results show that political connections, measured by being a deputy to the CPC, have 
a positive impact on the firm’s degree of trade expansion. Specifically, being a deputy to the CPC reduces the 
percentage of sales in the local county, and increases the trade in other counties in the same region and in other 
regions 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Political connections positively affect trade expansion by overcoming insecure property 
rights institutions and inefficient contracting institutions in other regions 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany 
Author(s): Niessen, A.; Ruenzi, S. 
Journal: German Economic Review 
Year: 2010 
Keywords: Political connectedness; firm value; firm performance 
Research objective/Question: This paper examines the value of political connections in Germany 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 605 firms from the German largest stock market index CDAX 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Bundestag website, Factset/JCF and Datastream 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Competition, Germany 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: 
Outcome: Stock and Operating performance – ROE, ROI 
 
Results 
Key findings: Politically connected firms are larger, less risky and have lower market valuations than 
unconnected firms. They also have fewer growth opportunities, but slightly better accounting performance. On 
the stock market, connected firms significantly outperformed unconnected firms in 2006. Politically connected 
firms provide better accounting as well as stock market performance. Specifically, politically connected firms 
had higher returns on equity (ROE) and returns on investments (ROI) in 2006 and 2007.  Regarding stock 
market performance, politically connected firms had higher raw returns, higher industry adjusted returns and 
higher Sharpe (1966) Ratios than unconnected firms in 2006. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: The data covers the years 2006 and 2007. While the data from 
the year 2006 has the unique advantage that information on political connections was not yet publicly available 
(and thus could not be reflected in stock prices but had an impact on stock returns), this data basis obviously is 
still extremely limited. It should be emphasized again that our results can only be interpreted as evidence for a 
positive correlation between various measures of political connections and firm performance. Causality 
statements cannot be made. Further studies could examine whether the probability of a delegate being re-elected 
depends on whether that person is on the payroll of a firm or not, or whether there is any impact on the stock 
price of firms if a delegate they are connected to is (or is not) re-elected. 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Political connections are valuable assets for firms 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
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Citation/Description 
Title: Politicians 'on Board': Do Political Connections Affect Banking Activities in Italy? 
Author(s): Carretta, A.; Farina, V.; Gon, A.; Parisi, A. 
Journal: European Management Journal 
Year: 2012 
Keywords: cooperative banks; politics; corporate governance 
Research objective/Question: This paper presents an empirical analysis to investigate whether politicians 
serving on the board of directors for banks influence performance, lending, and risk taking behaviours 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 123 Italian cooperative banks 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Bankscope, websites of parliament and ministry of Interior, annual 
reports of banks 
Methods of analysis: Regression analysis 
 
Themes 
Context: Italy 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: resource dependency 
Outcome: Operating performance – loans, interest revenues, equity 
 
Results 
Key findings: The results suggest that politicians who hold executive roles on the board of directors seem to 
exert a negative impact on banking activity. Politicians who hold executive roles on the board of directors seem 
to exert a negative impact on net interest revenues, loan portfolio quality and capitalization level; and a positive 
impact on banks’ efficiency in terms of overhead costs 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: Future studies could examine under what conditions 
interlocking directorates generated by political ties among banks and firms affect lending behaviour of banks. It 
is important to analyse if banks with politicians on the board differ in their behaviour on the basis of the strength 
of the political party in the reference area. 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: Politicians on the board have a generally negative impact 
on banking activity 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Corporate political strategies 
Author(s): Mathur, I.; Singh, M. 
Journal: Accounting & Finance 
Year: 2011 
Keywords: Corporate political strategies; Shareholder rights; Agency conflict; Lobbying 
Research objective/Question: The paper presents focused preliminary evidence on the determinants and value 
impact of corporate lobbying strategies. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics:  5452 firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Centre for Responsive Politics, COMPUSTAT 
Methods of analysis: Regression analysis 
 
Themes 
Context: United States 
111 | P a g e  
 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial – lobbying expenditure 
Mechanism implied by theory: agency theory 
Outcome: Operating performance – ROI and ROA 
 
Results 
Key findings: In terms of return on invested capital and return on assets, lobbying firms actually perform 
relatively poorly. However, they outperform nonlobbying firms in terms of return on equity. This is reflective of 
higher leverage in lobbying firms compared to nonlobbying firms. Lobbying positively influences value creation 
whether measured in MVA or EVA terms. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Lobbying firms are significantly more value generating – in terms of both the market 
value added and economic value added 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Managerial Ties and Firm Performance in a Transition Economy: the Nature of a Micro-Macro Link 
Author(s): Peng, M. W.; Luo, Y. 
Journal: Academy of Management Journal 
Year: 2000 
Keywords: Managerial ties, firm performance, China 
Research objective/Question: This paper examines the impact of managers' micro interpersonal ties with top 
executives at other firms and with government officials on macro organizational performance. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 127 managers 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Survey, CIBC, China Statistics Yearbook 
Methods of analysis: Regression analysis 
 
Themes 
Context: economic transition, China 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational – ties to managers and politicians 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital, Resource-based view, Resource dependency theory 
Outcome: Operating performance – ROA and market share 
 
Results 
Key findings: The results indicate that ties with government officials are more important than ties with 
managers at other firms, suggesting that firms may have greater resource dependence on officials than on other 
firms. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: The study did not examine the possible effect of firm 
performance on managerial ties. The relationship focused on may not be causal. Moreover, it relied primarily on 
perceptual measures and were unable to employ some of the more sophisticated quantitative techniques 
typically found in social network analysis 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Ties with government officials, on the other hand, have a consistently significant effect 
on both indicators of firm performance. 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
112 | P a g e  
 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Do Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures by Firms Create "Political" Capital? 
Author(s): Hersch, P.; Netter, J. M.; Pope, C. 
Journal: Atlantic Economic Journal 
Year: 2008 
Keywords: Political contributions, Lobbying expenditures, Tobin’s q, Political capital 
Research objective/Question: This paper examines the relation between a firm’s campaign contributions and 
lobbying expenditures and its Tobin’s q. It tests whether political expenditures (campaign contributions and 
lobbying) affect the value of the firm’s assets (through the intangible asset of political capital) as proxied by 
Tobin’s q. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 1331 firm year observations of publicly held firms with annual sales 
exceeding $500 million 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: COMPUSTAT, Centre for Responsive Politics 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial – contributions and lobbying expenditures 
Mechanism implied by theory: RBV 
Outcome: Stock performance – Tobin q 
 
Results 
Key findings: There is little relation between q and political contributions, suggesting that campaign 
contributions may not have long term effects on political markets. Campaign contributions do not create value 
by creating financial capital. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: 
No impact: Political spending does not seem to be valued as long-run capital 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Political connections, corporate governance and preferential bank loans 
Author(s): Yeh, Y.; Shu, P.; Chiu, S. 
Journal: Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 
Year: 2013 
Keywords: Political connection, Corporate governance, Preferential bank loan 
Research objective/Question: This paper investigates how political connections are related to preferential bank 
loans. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 858 listed firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ), the Market Observation Post System 
(MOPS) and the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) 
Methods of analysis: Event study, regression 
 
Themes 
Context: emerging economies, Taiwan 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital,  
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Outcome: Operating and stock performance – preferential loans, ROA, CARs 
 
Results 
Key findings: KMT-connected (DPP-connected) firms were associated with higher (lower) abnormal returns 
before the 2004 election. This pattern of returns was reversed after the unexpected win by DPP. Political 
connections were positively correlated with preferential bank loans.  KMT-connected firms were associated 
with a higher proportion of 3-year or beyond, non-collateral bank loans from government-controlled banks than 
their non-connected peers from 1998 to 2000. The average ROA is significantly higher for connected firms 
(5.03%) than it is for non-connected firms (3.90%). Moreover, politically connected firms are associated with a 
lower collateral value (46.14%) than that of connected firms (49.07%). 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research:  
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Political connections add value to firms 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: The Jeffords Effect 
Author(s): Jayachandran, S. 
Journal: Journal of Law and Economics 
Year: 2006 
Keywords: Jeffords, Republicans, Democrats, donations, stock returns 
Research objective/Question: In May 2001 Senator Jim Jeffords left the Republican Party and tipped control of 
the U.S. Senate to the Democrats. This paper uses the surprise event to demonstrate what is termed the "Jeffords 
effect": changes in the political landscape have large effects on the market value of firms. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 498 firms on Forbe’s 500 firms list for 2001 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Stock price data are from the Center for Research on Security Prices 
(CRSP) and soft money donations from Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
Methods of analysis: Event study 
 
Themes 
Context: Power change, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial – soft money donations 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital, agency theory 
Outcome: Stock performance - CARs 
 
Results 
Key findings: The Jeffords defection caused a firm that had donated $250,000 to the Republicans in the previous 
election cycle (which was the average among Republican donors in the sample) to lose 0.8% of market 
capitalization the week of Jeffords’ switch. Based on the point estimates, the same level of Democratic 
donations is associated with a gain in market value that is smaller in magnitude (0.4%), though the estimates are 
consistent with the coefficients being equal and opposite. The relationship between stock returns and political 
donations appears to persist for several weeks after the event. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: Future research could use the Jeffords event to try to determine 
the extent to which corporate donations cause politicians to be helpful to a firm. Another interesting topic would 
be if firms changed their donation strategy after the Jeffords event 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Firms derive value from political connections 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
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Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Friends in high places: The wealth effects of JFK's assassination on the assets of LBJ's supporters 
Author(s): Brown, W. 
Journal: Public Choice 
Year: 1996 
Keywords: Contributions, presidency, market value 
Research objective/Question: This paper uses anecdotal evidence to identify a group of firms that had significant 
ties to President Lyndon Johnson and determines the effect of Johnson's unexpected rise to the Presidency on 
the market value of these firms 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 63 firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Hand-picked from evidence of previous studies 
Methods of analysis: Event study 
 
Themes 
Context: power change, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial - contributions 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital 
Outcome: Stock performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: On average, the sixty-three firms experienced an increase in value that was 0.85% greater than 
predicted by the market model. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Political connections and campaign contributions significantly add value to firms. The 
markets expect significant benefits to accrue to firms that are connected to politicians. 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy success: 
Policy failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Are Antidumping Duties for Sale? Case-Level Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Protection for Sale 
Model 
Author(s): Evans, C. L.; Sherlund, S. M. 
Journal: Southern Economic Journal 
Year: 2011 
Keywords: antidumping, political activity, import penetration, duties 
Research objective/Question: Do contributions to politicians affect trade policy? This article examines the 
relationship between antidumping decisions and political activism 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 1126 cases 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Database compiled by Bruce Blonigen and Chad Brown, and ITC, 
ITA/DOC, and Customs and Border Protection Web sites and documents. PAC data from FEC, CRP 
Methods of analysis: Regression  
 
Themes 
Context: Regulation, competition, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial – PAC contributions 
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Mechanism implied by theory: social capital 
Outcome: Policy 
 
 
Results 
Key findings: The results indicate that money does matter. We find that politically active petitioners are more 
likely to receive protection and that antidumping duty rates tend to be higher for that group. In addition, the 
relationship between the import penetration ratio and duties imposed depends on whether or not petitioners are 
politically active—antidumping duties are positively correlated with the import penetration ratio for politically 
inactive petitioners but negatively correlated for politically active petitioners 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: Politically active petitioners are more likely to receive protection; we also find that 
antidumping duty rates tend to be higher for that group. 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Corporate Lobbying in Antidumping Cases: Looking into the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act 
Author(s): Lee, S.; Baik, Y. 
Journal: Journal of Business Ethics 
Year: 2010  
Keywords: antidumping, lobbying, protection, Byrd amendment 
Research objective/Question: This research examines the effect of corporate lobbying on the disbursement of 
proceeds of the recent antidumping petitions under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, the so-
called Byrd amendment. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 1251 petitions by 58 firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: U.S. Customs Service’s CDSOA database, Center for Responsive 
Politics, COMPUSTAT database 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Competition, regulation, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial – lobbying expenditure 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital, agency theory 
Outcome: Policy 
 
 
Results 
Key findings: Lobbying elasticity of CDSOA disbursement is 15%. That is, a 1% increase of corporate lobbying 
expenditure leads to 15% increase of CDSOA disbursement, when controlling for other things. Corporate 
lobbying is very effective in influencing the disbursement of antidumping duties under the CDSOA 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: Petitioning firms’ lobbying is found to increase their CDSOA disbursement proceeds 
significantly. The more a firm engages in lobbying activities, the greater the protection 
Policy Influence failure: 
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Citation/Description 
Title: Unions, PAC contributions, and the NAFTA vote 
Author(s): Steagall, J. W.; Jennings, K. 
Journal: Journal of Labor Research 
Year: 1996 
Keywords: PACs, NAFTA, voting 
Research objective/Question: This paper explores how PACs influenced the House of Representatives' vote on 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 430 representatives 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: CRP 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Regulation, competition, globalization, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial – PAC contributions 
Mechanism implied by theory: resource dependency 
Outcome: Policy – NAFTA agreement 
 
Results 
Key findings: Representatives who depended largely on labor PACs tended to oppose NAFTA, while 
Representatives who derived a large proportion of their campaign contributions from business PACs tended to 
favour its passage. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: PAC contributions explain the voting behaviour of members of the House of 
Representatives in the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis 
Author(s): Mian, A.; Sufi, A.; Trebbi, F. 
Journal: American Economic Review 
Year: 2010 
Keywords: special interests, contributions, congress, voting behaviour 
Research objective/Question: This article examines the effects of constituents, special interests (contributions), 
and ideology on congressional voting on two of the most significant pieces of legislation in US economic 
history 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 433 observations (votes) 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Equifax, CRP 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
Theoretical background: 
 
Themes 
Context/Geography: Regulation, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial - contributions 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital 
Outcome: Policy 
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Results 
Key findings: Special interests in the form of higher campaign contributions from the financial industry increase 
the likelihood of supporting the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. A strong predictor of voting behaviour 
on EESA is the amount of campaign contributions from the financial services industry. This finding is 
consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that the financial industry lobbied heavily to shape the EESA and 
get it passed. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: External validity is limited because the result presented is not 
informative of how legislators vote on all regulations.  
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: Special interest campaign contributions from the financial services industry are 
positively related to votes in favour of the EESA 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Determinants of Foreign Trade Mission Participation: An Analysis of Corporate Political and Trade 
Activities 
Author(s): Schuler, D. A.; Schnietz, K.  E.; Baggett, L. S. 
Journal: Business & Society 
Year: 2002 
Keywords: soft money, political donations, mission participation, political tactics, democratic party 
Research objective/Question: This article seeks to shed light on the popular debate over the mission selection 
process by analyzing factors resulting in firm selection for mission participation from 1993 to 1996. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 95 firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Department of Commerce, Lexis-Nexis, Business America, 
COMPUSTAT, Public Disclosure and FEC websites 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Competition, globalization, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital 
Outcome: Policy – trade mission participations 
 
Results 
Key findings: Firms making large soft money contributions to Democratic Party organizations were five times 
more likely to participate on a trade mission than firms not making soft money donations or making only PAC 
donations. Hard money donations to Democrats actually reduced a firm’s likelihood of trade mission 
participation, albeit by a small amount. Firms employing multiple political tactics were 3.5 times as likely to go 
on a trade mission as firms employing no political tactics or only one 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: Perhaps most important, the ideal analysis would compare 
firms that actually applied to the Department of Commerce for trade mission participation but were rejected. 
Second, data limitations restrict this analysis to a subset of only 48 of the actual 154 mission-participating firms. 
Finally, it is possible that trade mission participation is a form of business political activity rather than simply an 
outcome of business political activity. If so, then mission participation and political activity may be correlated 
because they are overlapping measures of the same construct. The link between soft money, rather than hard 
money, in explaining mission participation should direct researchers to consider soft money in future analyses of 
corporate political activity. Students of corporate political activity should distinguish between soft and hard 
money donations in research on political influence tactics after the mid-1990s. 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
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Positive performance: 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: Soft money donations allowed firms to participate in US foreign trade mission and 
policy 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Effects of top managers cabinet appointments on shareholder’s wealth 
Author(s): McGuire, J.; Schneeweis, T.; Naroff, J. 
Journal: Academy of Management Journal 
Year: 1988 
Keywords: cabinet appointment, management changes, value, executives 
Research objective/Question: This study examines how the appointment to cabinet position  of a firm’s 
executive affects the stock value 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 70 appointments 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Data from previous studies (McGuire and Schneeweis, 1985) 
Methods of analysis: Event study 
 
Themes 
Context: Management change, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: RBV, social capital 
Outcome: Stock performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: There is a significant increase in abnormal return in the 5 days following the appointment of 
executives to cabinet positions. Investors perceive management changes resulting from cabinet appointments 
more favourably than other types of management changes. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 5-day event window is long enough for any confounding events 
to affect the results. Data was small. Future studies could examine the impact of cabinet position, 
administration, and firm characteristics on the market reaction to executive succession.  
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Political appointments of firm executives add value to firms 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Mixing Family Business with Politics in Thailand 
Author(s): Imai, M. 
Journal: Asian Economic Journal 
Year: 2006 
Keywords: cronyism, political connection, family business, Thailand. 
Research objective/Question: This paper uses newly compiled data on Thai family businesses and their direct 
participation in politics to examine whether the political participation of family business yields private economic 
payoff. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 477 firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: Thai Business Group: A Unique Guide to Who Owns What, by the 
Brooker Group, SETSMART (Stock Exchange of Thailand) 
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Methods of analysis: Regression  
 
Themes 
Context/Geography: Emerging economy, Thailand 
Intervention/Strategy: Relational 
Mechanism implied by theory: institutional theory, social capital 
Outcome: Operating performance - ROA 
 
Results 
Key findings: The paper finds that the political participation of family members is positively associated with the 
profitability of family businesses. Furthermore, this ‘political benefit’ is found to be particularly large when 
firms are connected to cabinet members. Firms connected to cabinet members are found, on average, to enjoy 9 
percent higher profitability than unconnected firms. Furthermore, the profitability difference between firms 
connected to politicians who are not in the cabinet, and firms connected to cabinet members is 7 percent. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: Political connection is an important determinant of firm profitability in Thailand 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Did firms profit from soft money? 
Author(s): Ansolabehere, S.D.; Synder, J.M.; Ueda, M. 
Journal: Election Law Journal 
Year: 2004 
Keywords: soft money, returns, BCRA 
Research objective/Question: This paper uses event study methodology to measure whether firms that gave soft 
money to political parties received excessively high rates of returns from their contributions. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 446 of Fortune 500 firms  
Data sources/ Data collection methods: CRSP 
Methods of analysis: Event Study 
 
Themes 
Context: Competition, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial – soft money 
Mechanism implied by theory: agency theory 
Outcome: Stock performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: The events marking the passage of BCRA and the Court’s decision to uphold the law had no 
statistically discernible effect on the valuation of firms that gave large amounts of soft money. That is, the data 
are consistent with the hypothesis that all of the events had zero effect on the valuations of all types of firms 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: 
No impact: Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act did not affect the profitability of corporations that gave 
considerable amounts of soft money 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
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Citation/Description 
Title: Corporate political donations: investment or agency? 
Author(s): Aggarwal, R.K.; Meschke, F.; Wang, T.Y. 
Journal: Business & Politics 
Year: 2011 
Keywords: Political contributions; agency problems; stock returns 
Research objective/Question: This paper examines corporate donations to political candidates for federal offices 
in the United States from 1991 to 2004 and the impact of donations on firm performance 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 1,381 publicly traded firms 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: CRP, CRSP, DataStream 
Methods of analysis: Event Study, Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Competition, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial – soft money 
Mechanism implied by theory: agency theory 
Outcome: Stock performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: Donations are negatively correlated with returns. A $10,000 increase in donations is associated 
with a reduction in annual excess returns of 7.4 basis points. Donating firms engage in more acquisitions and 
their acquisitions have significantly lower cumulative abnormal announcement returns than non-donating firms. 
Donating to either winners or losers is associated with worse returns than not donating at all 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: Political donations are reflective of an agency problem 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency Rules 
Author(s): McKay, A.; Webb-Yackee, S. 
Journal: American Politics Research 
Year: 2007 
Keywords: Interest groups; organized interests; competitive lobbying; bureaucracy; agency rulemaking 
Research objective/Question: Do government agencies respond to lobbying by changing agency policies? 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 1,693 comments to 40 agency rules 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: U.S. Department of Labour’s Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration and Employment Standards Administration and the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal 
Railroad Administration and Federal Highway Administration 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context/Geography: competition, regulation, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Informational – comments 
Mechanism implied by theory: agency theory 
Outcome: Policy 
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Results 
Key findings: When one side of a policy issue dominates the public comment process, this dominant side is able 
to shift the implementation of public policy toward its preferred policy position. The content and the number of 
comments help determine the level of government regulation in final rules. The results suggest that the 
bureaucracy responds to the magnitude of the split in commenter preferences in addition to the direction of this 
split 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: Agencies change the content of final rules in favour of the side that dominates the 
submission of comments 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Do corporate PACs restrict competition? An empirical examination of industry PAC contributions and 
entry 
Author(s): Dean, T.; Vryza, M.; Fryxell, G. E. 
Journal: Business & Society 
Year: 1998 
Keywords: PAC spending, entry, industry structure 
Research objective/Question: This paper examines the impact of PAC on entry restriction in manufacturing 
industries  
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: firms from 220 manufacturing industries 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: US department of Commerce, Federal Trade Commission, Small 
Business Administration, FEC 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: competition, regulation, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial – PAC spending 
Mechanism implied by theory: social capital 
Outcome: Policy 
 
Results 
Key findings: PAC spending reduced entry of new firms. This finding is greater for concentrated industries 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: Data was limited; generalizations are limited; and correlations 
could be spurious due to absence of lagged variables. Future research could explore how PACs influence other 
industry structures, or explore the specific measures through which PACs influence industry structure or restrict 
competition 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: There is a negative relationship between PAC spending and entry of new firms 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: The returns from rent seeking: campaign contributions, firm subsidies and Byrd amendment 
Author(s): Liebman, B. H.; Reynolds, K. M. 
Journal: Canadian Journal of Economics 
122 | P a g e  
 
Year: 2006 
Keywords: anti-dumping, campaign contributions, disbursement 
Research objective/Question: This article examines Congressional support of a new law that distributes 
antidumping duties to protected firms. It determines whether the decision to sponsor the Byrd Amendment was 
influenced by contributions from firms that eventually received Byrd disbursements. Second, it investigates 
whether firms facing the biggest rewards from the Byrd Amendment (as measured in 2001 disbursements) 
contributed more funds to Congress prior to the bill’s passage to ensure its success. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 524 observations 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: FEC 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: competition, regulation, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial – PAC  contributions 
Mechanism implied by theory: resource dependency theory 
Outcome: Policy 
 
Results 
Key findings: Campaign contributions from beneficiaries increased the likelihood that lawmakers would 
sponsor the law, while contributions from the law’s beneficiaries increased with the rewards they expected to 
receive 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: Contributions from beneficiary firms increased a legislator’s probability of sponsoring 
the Byrd Amendment. Additionally, political contributions from the law’s beneficiaries increased with the 
rewards they expected to receive 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
Citation/Description 
Title: Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns 
Author(s): Cooper, M. J.; Gulen, H.; Ovtchinnikov, A. V. 
Journal: Journal of Finance 
Year: 2010 
Keywords: Contributions, abnormal returns, political connections 
Research objective/Question: This paper examines whether there exists a robust relation between firm 
contributions and contributing firm returns. 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection, size and characteristics: 1, 930 
Data sources/ Data collection methods: FEC, CSRP, COMPUSTAT 
Methods of analysis: Regression 
 
Themes 
Context: Competition, United States 
Intervention/Strategy: Financial 
Mechanism implied by theory: agency theory 
Outcome: Stock performance 
 
Results 
Key findings: There is a strong and robust correlation between PAC contributions and a firm’s future abnormal 
returns. The correlations are strongest for firms that support a greater number of candidates that hold office in 
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the same state that the firm is based in and for firms whose contributions are slanted toward House candidates 
and Democrats. 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research: 
 
Contribution to Review Question 
Positive performance: The number of supported candidates has a statistically significant positive relation with 
future abnormal returns for firms that contribute to political candidates. 
Negative performance: 
No impact: 
Policy Influence success: 
Policy Influence failure: 
 
 
